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The road to ideelle Verähnlichung 
Anton Marty’s Conception of Intentionality in the Light of its Brentanian Background 
Es ist wohl sicher, dass wer ein B-denkendes-A 
denkt, ausser dem B-denkenden auch B denkt. 
Ob er aber ausserdem auch von-A-gedachtes-B 
denkt, das ist die Frage.1 
The development of philosophical ideas in the school of Brentano was not structured like the neo-
platonic emanatory process: from the One (Brentano) to the multiplicity (the pupils). In fact, some 
pupils clearly distanciated themselves from the master and took proper theoretical positions. But when it 
comes to the name of a slavish pupil, Marty is invariably mentioned. In our view, this common place 
among Brentanians (pupils and historians of austro-german philosophy) should be reconsidered.   
In that respect, a study of Marty’s theory of intentionality seems quite appropriate. As we shall see 
(section 2, below), the final version of this theory makes of intentionality a potential or actual sui generis 
relation of similitude, called ideelle Verähnlichung (mental assimilation, MA)2, holding between the 
thinking subject and the object tout court (Gegenstand schlechtweg). The concept of MA has a long genesis, 
since it follows from discussions Marty had with Brentano but also with Husserl about the status of 
intentional objects and intentional relations. These discussions have lead to important modifications in 
Marty’s first theory of intentionality. We will present these different modifications and the progressive 
emergence of the concept of MA. Before formulating his definitive position, Marty already worked with 
the concept of a sui generis relation in his theory of intentionality, but this relation was a relation of quasi-
equality (Quasigleichheit), and it was holding between the intentional object and the object tout court, not 
between the subject and the object tout court. Marty, on his way to MA, has been profoundly influenced 
by Husserl in his acknowlegment of potential relations. After discussions with the reistic Brentano and 
Husserl, Marty decided to drop the intentional object. This last move lead him to share out the functions 
he attributed to the intentional object between the remaining elements of the intentional structure, 
namely the subject, its acts and the object tout court, a crucial move which eventually yielded his mature 
theory of intentionality. 
The elucidation of Marty’s last theory will help us to achieve the main goal of this paper: clarifying 
the degree of dependence of Marty upon Brentano with respect to intentionality. Nevertheless, we do 
not want to compare only the “mature” Marty to Brentano. Indeed, on the base of our “genetic” 
considerations, we shall also be able to describe the interaction between Marty and Brentano before the 
so-called Brentanian reistic period, namely before 19043.  
                                                      
1 F. BRENTANO, Relationen, ms. Ps 34 [partly undated], n°51070, Franz Clemens Brentano Compositions (MS Ger 230), 
Houghton Library, Harvard University. Many thanks to Mauro Antonelli, Guillaume Fréchette and Alain de Libera for their 
comments on a first draft of this paper. 
2 For the translation of ‘ideell’ with ‘mental’, see below, section 2, n. 130.  
3 The recent publication of Marty’s Deskriptive Psychologie will help us to determine more precisely Marty’s positions 
around 1894/1895 (A. MARTY, Deskriptive Psychologie, hrsg. v. M. Antonelli und J.-Ch. Marek, Königshausen & Neumann, 
Würzburg 2011 (« Studien zur österreichischen Philosophie », 43)). 
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This point, however, calls for some detailed explanations. As a matter of fact, some scholars have 
recently contested the canonical interpretation of Brentano’s pre-reistic theory of intentionality. One of 
these scholars, Mauro Antonelli, the coeditor of Marty’s Deskriptive Psychologie, even accused Marty of 
being the source of this canonical, and according to him, erroneous interpretation of Brentano: Marty’s 
early theory cannot be dependent on the one of Brentano, simply because Marty did not understand 
Brentano correctly. In other words, if we are to establish the degree of dependence of Marty on 
Brentano, we first have to clarify the two standard interpretations of Brentano’s concept of 
intentionality and see what confusion Marty could be charged with (provided he did confuse anything at 
all). Accordingly, in section 1, we introduce the canonical interpretation of Brentano’s theory of 
intentionality (the discontinuist interpretation, DI), and see on what bases Antonelli and other scholars 
propose a divergent reading (the continuist interpretation, CI). The comparison between these two 
interpretations also serves a heuristical purpose since it requires an explanation of the main concepts 
used in the Brentanian school for theorizing intentionality, namely: intentional object, immanent object, 
object per se or tout court (Gegenstand schlechtweg), mental correlate, inner perception, relative 
determination, existence, the real, and the non-real. All these concepts will be introduced and discussed 
in section 2, devoted to the evolution of Marty’s position. By way of a conclusion, we shall suggest an 
interpretation of Brentano’s theory of intentionality.  At the end of the day, the following pages point 
toward something like a rehabilitation of Marty with respect to philosophical originality. 
 
1. Brentano’s position(s) 
1.1. Two opposed interpretations of Brentano 
What exactly is « the part of a seen-colour obtained through modifying distinction »? This point 
of detail in the psychology of Brentano is currently the core of a debate about his whole theory of 
intentionality. The textual basis of the problem is to be found in a lecture of 1890/1891 edited in the 
volume Descriptive Psychology. After having established that every intentional relation has two members, 
namely an act of consciousness and a non-real correlate (a « seen-x », a « presented-x », a « wanted-x », 
etc.), Brentano says the following regarding the second member of this relation: 
‘Seen colour’ contains, in a manner of speaking, colour, not as a distinctional part in 
the strict sense, but as a part to be obtained from it by modifying distinction.4  
[transl. Müller] 
So, there is a difference between the seen-x and x itself, the latter being somehow contained in 
the former, and the access to x is given through a modifying distinction. 
One way of interpreting this text is to say that the seen-colour (i.e. the non-real correlate of the 
mental act) Is the intentional object, something internal to the subject, existing besides each of his mental 
acts. Such a seen-colour is of course not a « real » colour, for a real colour would be something which 
would exist « outside ». The consequence is that colour can come in two modes of being: a proper mode 
of being which concerns the colour « outside »; and an improper mode of being, called « being* », 
                                                      
4 F. BRENTANO, Deskriptive Psychologie, hg. v. R. M. CHISHOLM und W. BAUMGARTNER, mit einer Einleitung von R. 
M. CHISHOLM und W. BAUMGARTNER, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, 1982 (« Philosophische Bibliothek », 349), p. 27: 
« ‘Gesehene Farbe’ enthält gewissermassen Farbe in sich, nicht als distinktioneller Teil im eigentlichen Sinn, sondern als ein 
durch modifizierende Distinktion daraus zu gewinnender Teil » (F. BRENTANO, Descriptive Psychology, transl. by B. MÜLLER, 
Routledge, London, 1995, p. 29). 
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which concerns the colour as an intentional object (i.e. not a colour strictly speaking). It is thanks to 
inner perception that the perceiver realizes that the intentional object, which seems to be a transcendent 
entity when grasped by outer perception, is in fact a non-real subject-dependent entity, a being*. 
According to this reading, Brentano seems to be the defender of a kind of indirect realism. He would 
have established intermediary mental target-objects between the subject and reality. Associating 
Brentano with a well-nown philosophical position (manely that of representationalism), this 
interpretation is quite clear.  
Another way of interpreting this text consists in saying that the seen-colour (i.e. the non-real 
correlate of the mental act) is not the intentional object, but is the intentional correlate. As for the 
intentional object, the advocates of this second interpretation identify it as a pure object (object per se or 
tout court): it is simply what is presented, without considerations about being or not being. The correlate 
of the act is now nothing but a modified intentional object, grasped by inner perception as accompanying 
every mental act. Thus, the « seen-colour » is a modified colour grasped by inner perception as the non-
real correlate of one’s act of seeing. The colour, by contrast, is the intentional object grasped by one’s 
act of seeing. This understanding makes it difficult to subsume Brentano under any well-known 
philosophical position. It leads to admit two bizarre entities for every mental act, namely a "pure object" 
and a "non-real correlate". Neither of them seems to be something in the outer world, since the object 
can be non-existent and since the correlate is a mental entity. There is another peculiarity: the target-
object and the correlate of the act are distinct. This interpretation is quite odd. 
To summarize: i) on the first interpretation, the correlate is the intentional object and it has a 
particular mode of being; ii) on the second interpretation, the correlate is not the intentional object, and 
the intentional object does not have a particular mode of being5. 
                                                      
5 For summaries of the first interpretation, see W. SAUER, Die Einheit der Intentionalitätskonzeption bei Brentano, « Grazer 
Philosophische Studien », 73 (2006), pp. 1-26, p. 7, G. FRÉCHETTE, Deux concepts d'intentionnalité dans la Psychologie de 
Brentano, « Revue roumaine de philosophie », 55 (2011), p. 63-86, p. 72 and G. FRÉCHETTE, Brentano’s Thesis (Revisited), in D. 
FISETTE, G. FRÉCHETTE (eds.), Themes from Brentano, Rodopi, Amsterdam (forthcoming). For examples of schemas of the first 
and the second interpretations, see respectively A. CHRUDZIMSKI, Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen Brentano, Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, Dordrecht 2001 (« Phenomenologica », 159), p. 106 and M. ANTONELLI, Franz Brentano et l’‘inexistence 
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mental correlate (« thought-about-horse ») and the intentional object (« horse ») as identical, defending 
himself against Höfler’s accusations of confusion between content and object6. In spite of this letter, the 
first interpretation, as we will see, has been widespread, and it still is. The second interpretation 
resembles Brentano’s interpretation of his own work as presented in the aforesaid letter against Höfler’s 
reading. Brentano clearly rejects the idea that the intentional (or immanent) object is something relative 
to the act. He says in this letter that the object and the correlate should be absolutely distinguished, in 
other words that « it has never been [his] view that the immanent object = ‘presented-object’ (vorgestelltes 
Objekt) »7. However, the second interpretation has not been defended by scholars until recently, and 
only by a minority.  
Now, as we said above, Antonelli, in his introduction to Marty’s Deskriptive Psychologie, accuses 
Marty of having misunderstood Brentano’s theory of intentionality8. Antonelli considers that Marty has 
erroneously identified the Brentanian intentional (or immanent) object with an entity relative to the 
mental act, a non-real correlate. In other words, Marty would consider that the “terminus” of the 
intentional relation is a correlate, defending exactly the interpretation Brentano rejects. Indeed, in the 
aforementioned letter, Brentano’s explicit criticism is directed against Höfler’s accusations; but 
Antonelli considers that this letter is in fact directed against Marty: the confusion between object and 
correlate is Marty’s work, and Brentano is reminding him the right doctrine. We will ask in our 
conclusion whether Marty is rightly accused by Antonelli of having invented a false interpretation of 
Brentano. This, however, will only be possible after having studied carefully Brentano’s and Marty’s 
theories of intentionality. In this section, our purpose is to present in detail the two opposed 
interpretations of Brentano’s theory. 
 
1.1.1. The traditional discontinuist interpretation (DI) 
As we saw above, the first interpretation considers that the correlate is the intentional object 
and that it has a particular mode of being. We will now present the two theses involved here, namely: a) 
the correlate of a mental act and the intentional object are the same entity; b) this entity has a particular 
mode of being. 
 The first thesis follows from the relational aspect of Brentanian intentionality. Indeed, in the 
famous text of the Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint in which Brentano gives his definition of mental 
                                                      
6 F. BRENTANO, Wahrheit und Evidenz, hg. v. O. KRAUS, mit einer Einleitung von O. KRAUS, Felix Meiner Verlag, 
Hamburg, 1930 (« Philosophische Bibliothek », 201), p. 87-89 (F. BRENTANO, The True and the Evident, ed. by 
R. M. CHISHOLM, transl. by R. M. CHISHOLM, I. POLITZER, and K. R. FISCHER, Routledge, London, 1966, p. 52-53) 
published also in F. BRENTANO, Die Abkehr vom Nichtrealen, hg. v. F. MAYER-HILLEBRAND, mit einer Einleitung von F. MAYER-
HILLEBRAND, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, 1966/1977 (« Philosophische Bibliothek », 314), p. 119-121. Höfler argued in 
the Vth International Congress of Psychology in Rome, that psychology has to pay attention to the difference between content 
and object. The latter is not relative to the act, the former is: « "Inhalt" aber ist schlechterdings korrelativ zu "Akt" » (A. 
HÖFLER, Sind wir Psychologisten?, in Atti del V Congresso Internazionale di Psicologia tenuto in Roma dal 26 al 30 Aprile 1905, 
Forzani, Roma, p. 322-328, p. 327). Höfler says in a footnote (ibid., p. 327 n. 2) that Brentano hadn’t made this difference: 
« Trotz Brentano, der nicht nur überall "Inhalt" und "intentionales Objekt" gleichbedeutend nimmt, sondern meine schon 
damals hiergegen geäusserten Bedenken mit den Worten: "Was sollte das für ein Unterschied sein?" ausdrücklich 
zurückwies ». In the text of the Acts of the Congress, the equivalence between content and thought-about-x is not mentioned 
by Höfler, but one can find it in his Logic: « Jedem Vorstellen und Urteilen, oder Vorstellungs- und Urtheils-Act, entspricht 
ein Vorgestelltes und Geurtheiltes, oder Vorstellungs- und Urtheils-Inhalt » (A. HÖFLER, Logik. Unter Mitwirkung von Dr. 
Alexius Meinong, F. Tempsky/G. Freytag, Prague, Vienne, Leipzig, 1890, p. 6). So, given that Brentano makes allegedly no 
difference between object and content, his object, according to Höfler’s system, can be assimilated to a correlative thought-
about-x.  
7 F. BRENTANO, Wahrheit und Evidenz, p. 87 (transl. CHISHOLM, POLITZER, FISCHER, p. 52, modified). 
8  M. ANTONELLI, Die Deskriptive Psychologie von Anton Marty. Wege und Abwege eines Brentano-Schülers, in A. MARTY, 
Deskriptive Psychologie, pp. XXX-XXXIII, p. XLV. 
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phenomena, he talks of a « relation to a content » and a « direction toward an object » (Beziehung auf 
einen Inhalt; Richtung auf ein Objekt)9. But he says also, in the Psychology, that this relation is a relation to 
an object (Beziehung auf etwas als Objekt)10. The relational aspect of intentionality is constantly present in 
Brentano’s philosophy and is more and more developed over the years. Thus, in the lecture of 
1890/1891 published in the volume Descriptive Psychology, Brentano develops his theory of the 
intentional relation, saying that consciousness always involves « a certain kind of relation, relating a 
subject to an object »11:  
As in every relation, two correlates can be found here. The one correlate is the act of 
consciousness, the other is that <thing> which it is directed upon. Seeing and what is 
seen, presenting and what is presented, [...] etc.12 [transl. Müller] 
  
These correlates are epistemically and also ontologically interdependent13. If there is a thinking-
about-x, there has to be a thought-about-x as the former’s correlate. As a consequence, and given that 
the relation is a relation to an « object », the object is considered as the correlate ex parte rei; and given 
that this correlate is a « thought-about-x », we have the equivalence « object = thought-about-x »; this 
equivalence is defended in particular by Kastil, Kraus, Chisholm, Mulligan, Smith and Chrudzimski14. 
                                                      
9 F. BRENTANO, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt. Erster Band, hg. v. O. KRAUS, mit einer Einleitung von O. KRAUS, 
Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, 1874/1924 (« Philosophische Bibliothek », 192), p. 124 (F. BRENTANO, Psychology from an 
Empirical Standpoint, ed. by L. L. MCALISTER, transl. by A.C. RUNCURELLO, D.B. TERRELL, and L. L. MCALISTER, with a new 
introduction by P. SIMONS, Routledge, London, 2009, p. 68, modified).  
10 F. BRENTANO, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, p. 137 (transl. RUNCURELLO, TERRELL, MCALISTER, p. 74). The 
relation to an object is also to be found in the table of contents (F. BRENTANO, ibid., p. VI (transl. RUNCURELLO, TERRELL, 
MCALISTER, p. VII; and see p. 68 n. 11)). 
11 F. BRENTANO, Deskriptive Psychologie, p. 21 (transl. MÜLLER, p. 23). 
12 F. BRENTANO, Deskriptive Psychologie, p. 21: « Wie bei jeder Beziehung finden sich daher auch hier zwei Korrelate. Das 
eine Korrelat ist der Bewusstseinsakt, das andere das, worauf er gerichtet ist. Sehen und Gesehenes, Vorstellen und 
Vorgestelltes, [...] usw. » (transl. MÜLLER, p. 23-24). 
13 A manuscript from the Nachlass shows it clearly: « Korrelative Begriffe sind solche, welche ohne einander nicht gedacht 
werden können, und von welchen die Gegenstände ohne einander nicht bestehen können, obwohl keiner den anderen 
einschliesst und keiner dem anderen inhaltlich gleich ist. (...) Da die Gegenstände korrelativer Begriffe nicht ohne einander 
sein können, so ist offenbar, dass keiner etwas für sich, jeder, was es ist, nur in Verbindung mit dem anderen ist. So ist es in 
der That bei Sehendem und Gesehenem, Liebendem und Geliebtem, Glaubendem und Geglaubtem, Grenze und Begrenztem, 
Grund und Folge u.s.w., Zweck und Mittel u.s.w. » (F. BRENTANO, Vom Relativen, ms. M 32, 1889, n°30285-30286, Franz 
Clemens Brentano Compositions (MS Ger 230), Houghton Library, Harvard University).  
14 See K. MULLIGAN, B. SMITH, Franz Brentano on the Ontology of Mind, « Philosophy and Phenomenological Research », 45 
(1985/4), pp. 627-644, p. 637, B. SMITH, Austrian Philosophy. The Legacy of Franz Brentano, Open Court, Chicago, LaSalle, 
Illinois, 1994, p. 55-56, A. CHRUDZIMSKI, Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen Brentano, p. 21 sq., A. CHRUDZIMSKI, Die Ontologie 
Franz Brentanos, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht 2004 (« Phenomenologica », 172), p. 155-156. As Sauer showed 
(W. SAUER, Die Einheit der Intentionalitätskonzeption bei Brentano, p. 4-6 and p. 21), this was already established in the 
« Introduction » of the editors of the Descriptive Psychology, namely Roderick M. Chisholm and Wilhelm Baumgartner: « The 
intentional object is always ‘immanent’; it is something that is non-real, or insubstantial (unwesenhaft), but it may be said to 
exist – and to exist in itself – to the extent that the thinker has it as his intentional object. It is a non-real correlate of the 
thinking that has it as its object ». R. M. CHISHOLM, W. BAUMGARTNER, Einleitung der Herausgeber, in F. BRENTANO, 
Deskriptive Psychologie, pp. IX-XXI, p. XIII (transl. MÜLLER, p. XIX) – see also R. M. CHISHOLM, W. BAUMGARTNER, 
Anmerkungen der Herausgeber, in F. BRENTANO, Deskriptive Psychologie, pp. 165-177, p. 176 (transl. MÜLLER, p. 191) –, and 
before them by Alfred Kastil and Oskar Kraus (A. KASTIL, Anmerkungen der Herausgeber, in F. BRENTANO, Versuch über die 
Erkenntnis, hg. v. A. KASTIL, erweitert und neu eingeleitet von F. MAYER-HILLEBRAND, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg 
1925/1970, (« Philosophische Bibliothek », 194), pp. 259-300, p. 262 and O. KRAUS, Anmerkungen des Herausgebers, in F. 
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Thus, we should read the text of the Descriptive Psychology as a more developed theory of the « relation to 
an object », which was inchoative in the Psychology15. Now, the consequence of this thesis is that the 
object is said to be non-real, given that Brentano considers the correlate, the thought-about-x, as a non-
real entity16. Thus, we have a particular kind of entity, namely a non-real one, as object. This leads us to 
the second thesis. 
 It is well known that Brentano’s concept of intentionality has medieval sources17. Now, when 
Brentano introduces his famous definition of intentionality in the Psychology, he talks, using a medieval 
vocabulary, of the « intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object » (intentionale (auch wohl mentale) 
Inexistenz eines Gegenstandes)18. This isn’t a mere « façon de parler »19. According to the defenders of the 
first interpretation, inexistence is a particular kind of existence, something between being and non-
being; in other words (medieval ones, again), a diminished mode of being20. As Chisholm says, the 
intentional object is « short of actuality but more than nothingness »21. This lack of actuality is often 
considered as another way to express the non-reality of the object. For example by Smith:  
The intentionality of outer perception is in fact a relation between two mental 
entities, the (real) act of sensation and the (non-real, non-causally efficacious, 
abstract) quality sensed. The latter, for example experienced sounds and colours, 
have a diminished sort of existence, an existence ‘in the mind’. Certainly they are not 
real, but this does not mean that they are merely nothing. Rather, they are entia 
rationis, non-real parts of a real, mental substance.22 
                                                                                                                                                                         
BRENTANO, Wahrheit und Evidenz, pp. 167-220, p. 177, p. 183 and p. 192). Thus, originated by two pupils of Marty, this 
interpretation has been confirmed in the introduction of the Descriptive Psychology by Chisholm and Baumgartner and in the 
review of Mulligan/Smith, and widespread by Smith and Chrudzimski’s influential books. 
15 This kind of crescendo reading is defended by Chrudzimski (A. CHRUDZIMSKI, Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen Brentano, p. 
21). 
16 F. BRENTANO, Deskriptive Psychologie, p. 21 (transl. MÜLLER, p. 24): « […] these correlates display the peculiarity that 
the one alone is real, <whereas> the other is not something real [nichts Reales] ». 
17  On that topic, see in particular K. HEDWIG, Der scholastische Kontext des Intentionalen bei Brentano, « Grazer 
Philosophische Studien », 5 (1978), pp. 67-82, K. HEDWIG, Intention: Outlines for the History of a Phenomenological Concept, 
« Philosophy and Phenomenological Research », 39 (1979/3), p. 326-340, H. SPIEGELBERG, ‘Intention’ and ‘Intentionality’ in 
the Scholastics, Brentano and Husserl, in Linda L. McAlister (ed.), The Philosophy of Brentano, Duckworth, London 1976, p. 108-
127 and A. DE LIBERA, Le direct et l'oblique: sur quelques aspects antiques et médiévaux de la théorie brentanienne des relatifs, in A. 
REBOUL (ed.), Philosophical papers dedicated to Kevin Mulligan, Genève 2011 (http://www.philosophie.ch/kevin/festschrift/). 
18 F. BRENTANO, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, p. 124 (transl. RUNCURELLO, TERRELL, MCALISTER, p. 68). 
19 B. SMITH, Austrian Philosophy, p. 43. 
20 See A. MAURER, "Ens diminutum": A Note on its Origin and Meaning, « Mediaeval Studies », 12 (1950), pp. 216-222. A 
medieval theory where esse intentionale is an intermediate ontological category between esse reale and esse rationis is to find in 
the philosophy of James of Ascoli. On that topic, see D. PERLER, Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter, 2nd ed., Klostermann, 
Frankfurt am Main, 2004 (« Seminar », 3), p. 230-239. 
21 R. M. CHISHOLM, Intentionality, in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (vol. 4), P. EDWARDS (ed.), Collier/Macmillan, New 
York, London 1972, pp. 201-204, p. 201. See also J. T. J.SRZEDNICKI, Franz Brentano’s Analysis of Truth, Martinus Nijhoff, 
The Hague 1965, p. 30-31 and B. SMITH, Austrian Philosophy, p. 44. It is worth to specify that scholars consider often that the 
Psychology could be neutral with respect to the ontological status of the intentional object. Rather, they consider that the 
ontological commitment comes later in Brentano’s work, in particular in the Descriptive Psychology, since the non-reality of the 
correlate is established there (see for example A. CHRUDZIMSKI, B. SMITH, Brentano’s Ontology: From Conceptualism to Reism, in 
D. JACQUETTE (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Brentano, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004 (« Cambridge 
Companions to Philosophy »), pp. 197-219, p. 205).  
22 B. SMITH, Austrian Philosophy, p. 44. 
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 If we consider carefully this quotation, we see that we have here a combination of two different 
sorts of ontological modifications, namely a modification regarding things (a « non-real » thing), and a 
modification regarding modes of being (a « diminished sort of being »)23.  
 Chrudzimski explicitly discusses these two sorts of modifications24. He makes a distinction 
between the modification of the variable (∃x*), which leads to accept modified objects, and the 
modification of the quantifier (∃*x), which leads to accept modified modes of being. This distinction leads 
Chrudzimski to ask whether the presence of the intentional object (which is for him identical to the 
correlate) should preeminently imply a modified variable or a modified quantifier. At the end of the day, 
he considers that the non-reality of the Brentanian modified objects leads to accept a kind of modified 
« mode of being » (Seinsweise), different from the one of « ‘normal’ real objects »25. The hypothesis of 
Chrudzimski is that « Brentano’s theory postulates in most cases both modifications », so that these 
modifications are « correlative »26. Therefore, Chrudzimski reads Brentano as follows: an intentional 
object, which is the non-real mental correlate, is the bearer of a colour property. But being coloured as 
an intentional object is being coloured in an improper way. Thus, the intentional object is* coloured. 
Only a coloured object in the outer world, if it existed, would be coloured in a proper way27. This point 
has already been affirmed by Smith, who thinks that « [the] immanent objects are not (except in a 
modifying sense) red or green or warm or cold »28. 
 We can now come back to the text of the Descriptive Psychology about modified parts. It is 
important to notice that this text is concerned with the description of mental phenomena, which means that 
his analyses are principally made from the point of view of inner perception. Unlike outer perception, 
which provides doubtful knowledge, inner perception is always correct29. Thus, it shows the elements 
involved in psychic life as they are, in particular the act and its correlate. A way to interpret this is to say 
that outer perception shows (« wrongly ») the intentional object as « transcendent », that is to say: as 
something being coloured, not being* coloured30. Now, the object is not really coloured; it is coloured in 
a modified way. Thanks to inner perception, it appears as it is, i.e. as something modified. In other 
words, the point of view of inner perception shows the correlate as correlate: it shows it as non-real, as 
being* coloured31. As we saw, Brentano says that the colour is « a part to be obtained from [the seen-
                                                      
23 We will see that the defenders of the second interpretation consider that this combination is one of the mistakes of the 
first interpretation. 
24 It is important to notice that Chrudzimski is today the principal opponent of the second interpretation. He is the only 
advocate of the first interpretation who rejects the second explicitly (see A. CHRUDZIMSKI, Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen 
Brentano, p. 22, n. 15 and A. CHRUDZIMSKI, Die Ontologie Franz Brentanos, p. 155 n. 150), saying, as one can guess, that the 
intentional object and the correlate are identical. Given that the second interpretation is partly based on a criticism of the first, 
we want to preserve the « equality of arms » by emphasizing during the presentation of the first interpretation the only 
defender of it who discusses and rejects the second. 
25 A. CHRUDZIMSKI, Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen Brentano, p. 45-46. Schuhmann also considers that the correlate 
(which is identical with the immanent object) has a different « mode of being » (Seinsweise) (K. SCHUHMANN, Der 
Gegenstandsbegriff in Brentanos ‘Psychognosie’, « Brentano Studien », 5 (1994), pp. 167-176, p. 171). 
26 A. CHRUDZIMSKI, Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen Brentano, p. 119-120, underscored by the author.  
27 A. CHRUDZIMSKI, Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen Brentano, p. 47-48, p. 106. See also A. CHRUDZIMSKI, Die Ontologie 
Franz Brentanos, p. 157-158. This is only a brief summary of the long discussions Chrudzimski devotes to quantification and 
the modes of being of the intentional object. 
28 B. SMITH, Austrian Philosophy, p. 58. Here, « immanent » and « intentional » are synonymous. 
29 For a presentation of the concept of inner perception in Brentano’s work, see M. TEXTOR, Brentano (and some neo-
Brentanians) on inner consciousness, « Dialectica », 60 (2006/4), pp. 411-432. 
30 A. CHRUDZIMSKI, Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen Brentano, p. 106. 
31 A. CHRUDZIMSKI, Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen Brentano, p. 104: « dieses Korrelat wird im Urteil der inneren 
Wahrnehmung, das doch unfehlbar ist, natürlich als irreal anerkannt » (all underscored by the author). 
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colour] by modifying distinction »32. According to Smith, this part is the real colour: « the seen colour 
contains a real colour »33. To gain knowledge of it, the subject has to proceed to a « demodifying » 
noticing (Bemerken)34. It is only through such a mediation that a kind of access to the outer world is given. 
 It is worth noticing that an interpretation holding that the intentional object has a sui generis 
ontological status does not constrain to consider that this object is the only « target object » of the 
intentional relation. Indeed, Chrudzimski thinks that the act/object theory in Brentano’s work is 
twofold. We would have a first theory with an intentional object as a target object, and a second theory 
with two target objects, namely the intentional object and the transcendent object35. This second theory 
would have emerged in the years 1885-189136. Admittedly, the Psychology seems to establish a theory 
with only one object, since the immanent object of a presentation (Vorstellung) is not something which 
re-presents another object, but is a phenomenon understood as a kind of terminus ad quem: « as we use 
the verb ‘to present’, ‘to be presented’ means the same as ‘to appear’ »37. By contrast, some 
manuscripts of Brentano quoted by Chrudzimski show that Brentano is using a new meaning of the word 
‘presentation’ (Vorstellung), namely something like “re-presentation”, which seems to introduce a three-
places structure with a transcendent object: in the Psychology the immanent object was represented 
(Vorgestelltes) whereas in these manuscripts the immanent object is representing (Vorstellendes). For 
example, a well-known passage from the manuscript EL 80 could be read as leading to this kind of 
structure: 
In a certain way, the name indicates the content of a re-presentation [Vorstellung] as 
such, the immanent object [Gegenstand]. In a certain way, that, which is re-presented 
through the content of a re-presentation. The first is the meaning of the name. The 
second is that which the name names. We say of it that the name befits it. It is that 
which, if it exists, is the outer object [Gegenstand] of the re-presentation.38 
 Sofar, we have gathered the main elements of the first interpretation of Brentano. The reader 
could now ask: « but why call it ‘the discontinuist interpretation’ ? ». Response: the defenders of this 
interpretation think that the adoption of the so-called reism by Brentano leads to the abandonment of the 
                                                      
32 F. BRENTANO, Deskriptive Psychologie, p. 27 (transl. MÜLLER, p. 29). 
33 B. SMITH, Austrian Philosophy, p. 57. See also K. MULLIGAN, B. SMITH, Franz Brentano on the Ontology of Mind, p. 637 and 
K. SCHUHMANN, Der Gegenstandsbegriff in Brentanos ‘Psychognosie’, p. 173. 
34 F. BRENTANO, Deskriptive Psychologie, p. 27, p. 19 et p. 31 sq. (transl. MÜLLER, p. 29, p. 22 and p. 34 sq.). Chrudzimski 
seems to say that the demodification is done through a judgement, which leads to the acceptance of a being coloured, i.e. the 
intentional object is demodified from being* to being before acceptation, so that we eventually judge about real things (A. 
CHRUDZIMSKI, Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen Brentano, p. 82 and p. 106).  
35  A. CHRUDZIMSKI, Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen Brentano, p. 37. We will not discuss here Chrudzimski’s 
interpretation of the intentional object as a « mediator » between the subject and the transcendent object. See in particular A. 
CHRUDZIMSKI, Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen Brentano, p. 26 sq. 
36 A. CHRUDZIMSKI, Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen Brentano, p. 107. 
37 F. BRENTANO, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, p. 114 (transl. RUNCURELLO, TERRELL, MCALISTER, p. 62). The 
german text says: « Wie wir das Wort ‘vorstellen’ gebrauchen, ist ‘vorgestellt werden’ so viel wie ‘erscheinen’», 
38 F. BRENTANO, Logik, hg. v. R. ROLLINGER, 2011, p. 35: « Der Name[n] bezeichnet in gewisser Weise den Inhalt einer 
Vorstellung als solcher, den immanenten Gegenstand. In gewisser Weise das, was durch den Inhalt einer Vorstellung 
vorgestellt wird. Der erste ist die Bedeutung des Namens. Das zweite ist das, was der Name nennt. Von ihm sagen wir, es 
komme der Name ihm zu. Es ist das, was, wenn es existiert, äusserer Gegenstand der Vorstellung ist ». Quoted in 
A. CHRUDZIMSKI, Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen Brentano, p. 33. See also the quotation of the manuscript Ps 21 (1889, or 
1899), in A. CHRUDZIMSKI, Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen Brentano, p. 38. See F. BRENTANO, Die Lehre vom richtigen Urteil, 
hg. v. F. MAYER-HILLEBRAND, mit einer Einleitung von F. MAYER-HILLEBRAND, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, 1956/1978 
(« Philosophische Bibliothek », 311), p. 47. 
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ontologically peculiar intentional (i.e. immanent) objects39. Reism is a theory which affirms, from an 
ontological point of view, that only concrete individual entities (things, Dinge, res) exist, and, from a 
psychological point of view, that only concrete individual entities can be presented40. The locus classicus 
for the so-called abandonment of the intentional object is Brentano’s first chapter of the 1911 Appendix 
to the second volume of the Psychology41. In this text, Brentano says that unlike standard relations, which 
require the existence of both of their « members », the intentional relation requires only the existence of 
one of them, namely the thinker’s:  
It is entirely different in the case of psychic relation. If someone thinks of something, 
the one who is thinking must certainly exist, but the object of his thinking need not 
exist at all.42 [transl. Runcurello, Terrell, McAlister, slightly modified]  
 We said before that correlates are epistemically and above all ontologically interdependent. So, 
the peculiar ontological status of the intentional object allowed preserving the relational aspect of 
intentionality in Brentano’s theory: even if there is nothing existing which corresponds to the object of 
presentation, nevertheless the ontological non-reducible status of the latter makes the intentional 
relation have its two correlates43. Now, since he adopted reism, Brentano considered that irrealia cannot 
be taken seriously from an ontological point of view. Loosing one of the correlates, Brentano has to give 
up the relational aspect of intentionality. This is why he calls it something « quasi-relational » (etwas 
Relativliches)44. He consequently admits that for intentionality to occur, a particular non relational  
property – that of « thinking x-ly » – is sufficient. In other words, Brentano switches from a relational to 
an adverbial theory of intentionality45. Even if, from an ontological point of view, intentionality is not a 
relation anymore, it still has to be relationally described:  
                                                      
39  R. M. CHISHOLM, Intentional Inexistence, in ID., Perceiving, chap. 9, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1957 
(« Contemporary Philosophy »), pp. 168-185, p. 170 n. 2, R. M. CHISHOLM, Editor’s Introduction, in ID. (ed.), Realism and the 
Background of Phenomenology, Ridgeview, Independence, Ohio, 1960, pp. 3-36, p. 4-5, R. M. CHISHOLM, Brentano on 
Descriptive Psychology and the Intentional, in E. N. LEE, M. H. MANDELBAUM (eds.), Phenomenology and Existentialism, John 
Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1967, pp. 1-23, p. 6, p. 11 and p. 13 sq., R. M. CHISHOLM, Franz Brentano, in The Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (vol. 1), P. EDWARDS (ed.), Collier/Macmillan, New York, London, 1972, p. 365-368, p. 365, R. M. CHISHOLM, 
Intentionality, p. 201-202, R. M. CHISHOLM, Brentano and Meinong Studies, Rodopi, Amsterdam, 1982, p. 39, R. M. CHISHOLM, 
W. BAUMGARTNER, Einleitung der Herausgeber, p. XIV and p. 16 (transl. MÜLLER, p. XX and p. XXII), A. CHRUDZIMSKI, 
Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen Brentano, p. 233 sq., A. CHRUDZIMSKI, Die Ontologie Franz Brentanos, p. 188-193, B. SMITH, 
Austrian Philosophy, p. 84. 
40 For the twofold aspect, psychological and ontological, of reism, see M. ANTONELLI, Seiendes, Bewusstsein, Intentionalität 
im Frühwerk von Franz Brentano, Karl Alber, Freiburg, München 2001 (« Phänomenologie: 2, Kontexte », 10), p. 267. 
41 F. BRENTANO, Von der Klassifikation der psychischen Phänomene (Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt. Zweiter Band), 
hg. v. O. KRAUS, mit einer Einleitung von O. KRAUS, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, 1911/1925 (« Philosophische 
Bibliothek », 193), p. 133-138 (transl. RUNCURELLO, TERRELL, MCALISTER, p. 211-214). 
42 F. BRENTANO, Von der Klassifikation der psychischen Phänomene, p. 134: « Ganz anders ist es dagegen bei der psychischen 
Beziehung. Denkt einer etwas, so muss zwar das Denkende, keineswegs aber das Objekt seines Denkens existieren » (transl. 
RUNCURELLO, TERRELL, MCALISTER, p. 212). The use of the neutral word « member » is inspired by Chrudzimski’s 
« Glied » (A. CHRUDZIMSKI, Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen Brentano, p. 234). 
43 A. CHRUDZIMSKI, Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen Brentano, p. 21-22 and p. 234. 
44 F. BRENTANO, Von der Klassifikation der psychischen Phänomene, p. 134 (transl. RUNCURELLO, TERRELL, MCALISTER, p. 
212). 
45 R. M. CHISHOLM, Brentano on Descriptive Psychology and the Intentional, p. 15 sq., R. M. CHISHOLM, Intentionality, p. 202, 
A. CHRUDZIMSKI, Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen Brentano, p. 235, A. CHRUDZIMSKI, Die Ontologie Franz Brentanos, p. 190, A. 
CHRUDZIMSKI, B. SMITH, Brentano’s Ontology: From Conceptualism to Reism, p. 215.  
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The solution that we propose is to assume that the true Brentanian ontology of 
intentionality is indeed an adverbial ontology as outlined above, but to insist at the 
same time that the only specification of the meaning of the corresponding adverbial 
determinations which a human being would be able to give is in terms of putative 
objects of presentation. According to this interpretation, the ontology of 
intentionality is at bottom adverbial, but the ‘ideology’ of intentionality must for 
cognitive agents like ourselves refer to the putative objects of intentions.46 
 This would be the reason why Brentano says that for intentionality to be the case, besides the 
presentation and existence of a subject in modo recto, a presentation (not the existence) of an object is 
needed in modo obliquo47. 
 To conclude, then, we can take a look at the famous letter to Marty (17 March 1905). Brentano 
explicitly says that « it has never been [his] view that the immanent object = ‘presented-object’ (vorgestelltes 
Objekt) »48. In other words, he expressly says, in advance, that the interpretation of Kastil, Kraus, 
Chisholm, Mulligan, Smith and Chrudzimski is false. The strategy of the defenders of the first 
interpretation consistis in saying that Brentano did in fact once admit this equivalence, but that he 
somehow forgot it since he eventually adopted reism and thus abandoned the ontology of the intentional 
object49. But the problem is that Brentano is very precise about this point. He not only says that he never 
considered the intentional object as something equivalent to the « presented-x », but he also stresses that 
the « presented-x » is the correlate of the mental act whereas « x » is the intentional object. In other 
words, he clearly rejects the first interpretation by dissociating the correlate and the intentional object. 
He likens the « presented-x » to the secondary object, i.e. the object of inner perception, in opposition 
to « x » which is the primary object of presentation50. In short: his self-interpretation tallies with the 
aforementioned « second interpretation ». 
1.1.2. The minority continuist interpretation (CI) 
 According to the advocates of the second interpretation, principally Werner Sauer, Mauro 
Antonelli and Guillaume Fréchette (but also on some points Klaus Hedwig, Linda McAlister and Otis T. 
Kent), the correlate and the intentional object are distinct, and the intentional object does not have a 
particular mode of being51.  
 The difference between the correlate and the intentional object is grounded on at least two 
passages in Brentano’s Psychology. They both concern the problem of the attribution of the relational 
                                                      
46 A. CHRUDZIMSKI, B. SMITH, Brentano’s Ontology: From Conceptualism to Reism, p. 216. 
47 F. BRENTANO, Kategorienlehre, hg. v. A. KASTIL, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, 1933 (« Philosophische Bibliothek », 
203), p. 169 (F. BRENTANO, The Theory of Categories, transl. by R. M. CHISHOLM and B. GUTERMAN, Martinus Nijhoff, The 
Hague, Boston, London, 1981, p. 127). See A. CHRUDZIMSKI, Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen Brentano, p. 236 sq. 
48 F. BRENTANO, Wahrheit und Evidenz, p. 87 (transl. CHISHOLM, POLITZER, FISCHER, p. 52, modified). 
49 O. KRAUS, Anmerkungen des Herausgebers, in F. BRENTANO, Wahrheit und Evidenz, p. 177 and p. 183 (see W. SAUER, Die 
Einheit der Intentionalitätskonzeption bei Brentano, p. 5), R. M. CHISHOLM, Brentano on Descriptive Psychology and the Intentional, p. 
11 n. 18, F. MAYER-HILLEBRAND, Anmerkungen, in F. BRENTANO, Die Abkehr vom Nichtrealen, pp. 395-434, p. 407 (see M. 
ANTONELLI, Die Deskriptive Psychologie von Anton Marty. Wege und Abwege eines Brentano-Schülers, in A. MARTY, Deskriptive 
Psychologie, pp. XI-LXXVIII, p. XLIV n. 52), A. CHRUDZIMSKI, Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen Brentano, p. 27. 
50 F. BRENTANO, Wahrheit und Evidenz, p. 88-89 (transl. CHISHOLM, POLITZER, FISCHER, p. 52-53). 
51 W. SAUER, Die Einheit der Intentionalitätskonzeption bei Brentano, M. ANTONELLI, Die Deskriptive Psychologie von Anton Marty, 
G. FRÉCHETTE, Deux concepts d'intentionnalité dans la Psychologie de Brentano, G. FRÉCHETTE, Brentano’s Thesis (Revisited), K. 
HEDWIG, Über das intentionale Korrelatenpaar, « Brentano Studien », 3 (1990-1991), p. 47-61, L.L. MCALISTER, Brentano’s 
Epistemology, in D. JACQUETTE (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Brentano, p. 149-167, O. T. KENT, Brentano and the Relational 
View of Consciousness, « Man and World », 17 (1984/1), pp. 19-51. 
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predicate « being-perceived » to objects. 
 In the first passage, Brentano discusses an opinion of Alexander Bain, who considers that outer 
perception yields only knowledge of things as perceived, because one cannot get any knowledge of a 
thing through outer perception without having perceived it. In other words, it would be contradictory 
to say that knowledge acquired through perception is not a knowledge of perceived things. Brentano 
does not agree, principally because he considers that physic phenomena do not contain « being-
perceived » as one of their moments (Moment):  
Only if the state of being presented were contained in the colour as one of its 
moments, as a certain quality and intensity is contained in it, would a colour which is 
not presented imply a contradiction, since a whole without one of its parts is indeed a 
contradiction. But this is obviously not the case.52  [transl. Runcurello, Terrel, 
McAlister, slightly modified] 
 Physical phenomena, like colours, etc., even though they are perceived, are not perceived as 
perceived. Therefore, it is not contradictory to consider them as existing in themselves, even if one 
denies, as Brentano does, that they exist53. The consequences of this passage for the object/correlate 
problem are important. Indeed, colours, being physical phenomena, are, according to the Psychology, 
immanent or intentional objects of outer perception54. As for the correlates, we saw above that they are 
always described as « seen-x », « presented-x », etc. So, if colours do not have « seen », « presented », 
« perceived » as moments, these objects of outer perception are not correlates55.  
 The second passage is even more explicit. Brentano says, concerning sound (which is a physical 
phenomenon and so an intentional object of outer perception):  
The concept of sound is not a relative concept. 56  [transl. Runcurello, Terrel, 
McAlister] 
 Besides being apparently sufficient to confirm the difference between object and correlate, this 
affirmation is supported by a systematic argument about inner perception. As is well known, Brentano 
considers that every mental act of outer perception is accompanied by a concomitant inner perception. 
Now, in this complex structure, two objects have to be considered. The primary object is the physical 
phenomenon, which is object of the act of outer perception; the secondary object, the object of inner 
perception, is the whole structure, namely the act of outer perception, its correlate and the inner 
                                                      
52 F. BRENTANO, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, p. 130-131: « Nur wenn das Vorgestellt-sein als ein Moment in 
der Farbe enthalten wäre, so etwa wie eine gewisse Qualität und Intensität in ihr enthalten ist, würde eine nicht vorgestellte 
Farbe einen Widerspruch besagen, da ein Ganzes ohne einen seiner Teile in Wahrheit ein Widerspruch ist. Dieses aber ist 
offenbar nicht der Fall » (transl. RUNCURELLO, TERRELL, MCALISTER, p. 71). 
53 F. BRENTANO, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, p. 132 (transl. RUNCURELLO, TERRELL, MCALISTER, p. 71). 
54 F. BRENTANO, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, p. 205: « (...) with the immanent object of sensation, with the 
physical phenomenon toward which the act of sensation is directed as toward its primary object » (transl. RUNCURELLO, 
TERRELL, MCALISTER, p. 71); where, again, ‘immanent’ and ‘intentional’ are considered as synonymous. For a criticism of 
this reading, see G. FRÉCHETTE, Deux concepts d'intentionnalité dans la Psychologie de Brentano, p. 81 and G. FRÉCHETTE, 
Brentano’s Thesis (Revisited). 
55 See on that topic M. ANTONELLI, Die Deskriptive Psychologie von Anton Marty, p. XXXIV-XXXV and W. SAUER, Die 
Einheit der Intentionalitätskonzeption bei Brentano, p. 12 n. 10. 
56 F. BRENTANO, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, p. 185: « Der Begriff Ton ist kein relativer Begriff » (transl. 
RUNCURELLO, TERRELL, MCALISTER, p. 101). 
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perception itself57. Evidently, the act of outer perception is not object of outer perception, otherwise 
the use of the word ‘outer’ would be meaningless:  
The act of hearing appears to be directed toward sound in the most proper sense of 
the term, and because of this it seems to apprehend itself incidentally and as 
something additional.58 [transl. Runcurello, Terrel, McAlister] 
 The aforesaid Brentanian argument against the relativity of the intentional object concerns this 
problem, i.e. the problem of the act of outer perception becoming its own object: if sound were a 
relative concept, Brentano says, « the act of hearing would not be the secondary object of the mental 
act, but instead it would be the primary object along with the sound »59. This argument has been 
precisely developed by Werner Sauer, so that we propose to follow his reformulation. If the sound is 
considered as something relative, the proposition ‘the sound is the primary object of the psychic act 
hearing-of-the-sound’ would mean ‘the heard-sound is the primary object of the psychic act hearing-of-
the-sound’. And since correlates are epistemically interdependent – which means that one cannot be 
cognized without the other60 –, the consequence would be: ‘the hearing-of-the-sound is the primary 
object of the psychic act hearing-of-the-sound’61. This consequence is not acceptable for Brentano, and 
this would be the reason why he denies that the intentional objects of outer perception, i.e. the physical 
phenomena, are relatives. This point is reaffirmed in the letter to Marty:  
The ‘thought-about-horse’ considered as object would be the object of inner 
perception, which the thinker perceives whenever himself forms a correlative pair 
with the thought-about-thing; for correlatives are such that one cannot be perceived 
without the other. But what are experienced as primary objects, or what are thought 
universally as primary objects of reason, are never themselves the objects of inner 
perception.62 [transl. Chisholm, Politzer, Fischer, modified] 
 Therefore, the intentional object is apparently not the « seen-x », the correlate Brentano talks 
about in the Descriptive Psychology – as Fréchette says, the words “object” and “correlate” are not co-
extensive63. But what is the object, then? In other words, if it is not the non-real entity about which 
Brentano is talking in the Descriptive Psychology, i.e. if it is not a modified entity (∃x*), does it at least 
                                                      
57 See M. ANTONELLI, Franz Brentano et l’‘inexistence intentionnelle’, p. 477. See M. TEXTOR, Brentano (and some neo-
Brentanians) on inner consciousness, p. 425-430 concerning the grasping by inner perception of the whole of which inner 
perception itself is a part. 
58 F. BRENTANO, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, p. 180: « Dem Tone erscheint das Hören im eigentlichsten Sinne 
zugewandt, und indem es dieses ist, scheint es sich selbst nebenbei und als Zugabe mit zu erfassen » (transl. RUNCURELLO, 
TERRELL, MCALISTER, p. 98). 
59 F. BRENTANO, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, p. 185 (transl. RUNCURELLO, TERRELL, MCALISTER, p. 101). 
60 F. BRENTANO, Vom Relativen: « [sie können] ohne einander nicht gedacht werden »; see also F. BRENTANO, Versuch über 
die Erkenntnis, p. 45: « das Eine [kann] nicht bloss nicht ohne das Andere sein, sondern auch nicht ohne dasselbe erkannt 
werden » (quoted in Sauer 2006, p. 5). 
61 W. SAUER, Die Einheit der Intentionalitätskonzeption bei Brentano, p. 11. See also M. ANTONELLI, Die Deskriptive Psychologie 
von Anton Marty, p. XXXIV.  
62 F. BRENTANO, Wahrheit und Evidenz, p. 88-89 « Das ‘gedachte Pferd’ als Objekt genommen, wäre Gegenstand der 
inneren Wahrnehmung, die das Denkende wahrnimmt, wenn dies mit dem Gedachten ein Paar Korrelative bildete, da 
Korrelative ohne einander nicht wahrnehmbar sind. Das, was als primäres Objekt empfunden oder vom Verstand universell 
als primäres Objekt gedacht wird, ist aber doch nicht Gegenstand der inneren Wahrnehmung » (transl. CHISHOLM, POLITZER, 
FISCHER, p. 53).  
63 G. FRÉCHETTE, Brentano’s Thesis (Revisited). 
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have a particular mode of being (∃*x)? The answer of the defenders of the second interpretation is 
negative. The reason is that they defend the thesis of the Brentanian « univocity of existence »64. 
« Existence » is a concept elucidated by Brentano in the frame of his theory of judgement. The 
affirmative judgement « A is » means that a subject accepts A65. The acceptance of A can either be 
correct or not. If it is correct, A is said to be existent. Thus, « existent » means « something which is 
correctly accepted » (richtig Anerkanntes). ‘Existent’ is a relational word:  
If ‘existent’ is a name in the logical sense, i.e. a word which names a reality, 
something that is judged affirmatively, it is a relational word. I use it to indicate that I 
am thinking of a reality as corresponding to my thinking (and also, naturally, that I 
am thinking of myself as thinking correctly).66 [transl. Chisholm, Politzer, Fischer, 
modified] 
 According to the defenders of the second interpretation, there is no other sense in which 
existence could be understood in Brentano’s work. A Brentanian « half existence » would be 
untraceable, in spite of the first interpretation67. 
 But we still do not know what the intentional object is. If it is not a non-real « half existing » 
thing, should we say that it is real and existing?  
 To answer this question, the difference between real and existent has to be noticed in Brentano’s 
philosophy. Indeed, according to the defenders of the second interpretation, reality and existence are 
absolutely separated68. As Antonelli says, « the real isn’t opposed to the non-existant, but to the non-
                                                      
64 W. SAUER, Die Einheit der Intentionalitätskonzeption bei Brentano, p. 10, M. ANTONELLI, Die Deskriptive Psychologie von 
Anton Marty, p. XXXIX and M. ANTONELLI, Franz Brentano et l’‘inexistence intentionnelle’, p. 479.  
65 F. BRENTANO, Von der Klassifikation der psychischen Phänomene, p. 49 (transl. RUNCURELLO, TERRELL, MCALISTER, p. 
161). 
66 F. BRENTANO, Wahrheit und Evidenz, p. 79: « der Name [Existierendes] im logischen Sinn, d. h. der das Reale nennt, 
was hier positiv gedacht wird, ist ein relativer. Ich zeige an, dass ich ein Reales als meinem Denken korrespondierend (und 
natürlich zugleich, dass ich mich als richtig positiv denkend) denke » (transl. CHISHOLM, POLITZER, FISCHER, p. 47). F. 
BRENTANO, ibid., p. 24: « Das Gebiet, für welches die bejahende Beurteilungsweise die passende ist, nennen wir nun das 
Gebiet des Existierenden, ein Begriff, der also wohl zu unterscheiden ist von dem Begriffe des Dinglichen, Wesenhaften, 
Realen; das Gebiet, für welches die verneinende Beurteilungsweise die passende ist, nennen wir das des Nichtexistierenden » 
(transl. ibid., p. 14: « Let us say that the area to which affirmative judgement is appropriate is the area of the existent, a 
concept to be sharply distinguished from that of thing; and that the area to which the negative judgement is appropriate is the 
area of the non-existent », modified). See W. SAUER, Die Einheit der Intentionalitätskonzeption bei Brentano, p. 10, M. ANTONELLI, 
Die Deskriptive Psychologie von Anton Marty, p. XXXIX. This does not mean that existence is reduced to psychology: « Das 
Gebiet des Existierenden, worunter die Urteilsinhalte als Wahrmacher der jeweiligen Urteile fallen, ist natürlich ontologisch 
von der Urteilsfunktion als solcher unabhängig. Der Begriff des Existierenden kann allerdings nur durch Reflexion auf ein 
wahres affirmatives Urteil gebildet werden » (M. ANTONELLI, Seiendes, Bewusstsein, Intentionalität im Frühwerk von Franz Brentano, 
p. 411, n. 149). In this paper, we won’t discuss the Brentanian theory of truth. See on that topic J. T. J.SRZEDNICKI, Franz 
Brentano’s Analysis of Truth.  
67 See G. FRÉCHETTE, Deux concepts d'intentionnalité dans la Psychologie de Brentano, p. 72-77, who explicitly admits Sauer’s 
interpretation of Brentano but seems nevertheless to consider that the concept of existence has two different meanings. This 
last point is abandoned in G. FRÉCHETTE, Brentano’s Thesis (Revisited). 
68 See W. SAUER, Die Einheit der Intentionalitätskonzeption bei Brentano, p. 8-9, M. ANTONELLI, Die Deskriptive Psychologie von 
Anton Marty, p. XXXVIII, G. FRÉCHETTE, Deux concepts d'intentionnalité dans la Psychologie de Brentano, p. 67, G. FRÉCHETTE, 
Brentano’s Thesis (Revisited). The Brentanian difference between reality and existence is said to be inspired by the medieval 
distinction between Quid sit ? (« what is it ? ») and An sit ? (« does it exist ? »), originally founded on the Aristotelian 
distinction between ὄν κατὰ τὰς κατηγορίας (being in the sense of the categories) and ὄν ὡς ἀληθές (being as true). 
Whereas the quid question concerns the reality in the sense of the quiddity or essence of something, the an question asks 
about the existence of something. See also, on the Brentanian difference between reality and existence, J.-F. COURTINE, Aux 
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real ». A reality, also named « thing » (Ding), is a « concrete, individual entity », for example a man, a 
horse or a centaur69; a non-reality is everything which is not this kind of entity, for example « a 
privation, a state of affairs or an ens rationis »70. For the pre-reist Brentano, realities as well as non-
realities can exist71. For example: just like a horse (which is an individual concrete thing) can exist, a 
thought-about-horse (which is an ens rationis) can exist72. They both exist in the same way. Thus, 
Brentano admits altered objects (∃x*), even if he allegedly does not, as we saw, admit altered 
quantifiers (∃*x)73. 
 So, what about the intentional object according to the second interpretation? 
 First, the reality: For Brentano (before reism), both realities and non-realities can be intentional 
objects74. Just like a centaur (an individual concrete thing) can be an intentional object, a thought-about-
centaur (an ens rationis) can be an intentional object75. When you think of a centaur, you do not have a 
thought-about-centaur as object, but a centaur. The thought-about-centaur is your correlate. Having a 
thought-about-centaur as object occurs when you think of a thought-about-centaur of someone else’s 
thinking. Here, the correlate of this someone else’s thinking is your primary object of thought, whereas 
the correlate of your thinking is a « thought-about-thought-about-centaur »76. 
 Second, the existence: For Brentano, an intentional object does not need to exist. Indeed, one can 
have non-existent things as objects, for example a centaur. As Kent says, the intentional object is an 
« object ‘per se’ »:  
Whenever we mentally refer to something, we refer to it as an object. We are in a 
sense referring thereby to neither an existent object nor a non-existent object. To 
have an object before the mind, as Brentano suggests, is for something to be 
presented independently of its existential status. In itself this is merely a contingent 
fact about our epistemic powers. The world is so constituted that we are able to 
perceive and think about things independently of perceiving or thinking about them 
                                                                                                                                                                         
origines de la phénoménologie : l’aristotélisme de Franz Brentano, in ID., La cause de la phénoménologie, chap. 2, Presses 
universitaires de France, Paris 2007 (« Epiméthée »), p. 37-74, p. 65 and J. BENOIST, Le dispositif onto-logique et les deux 
critiques possibles de Meinong, in  ID., Représentations sans objet. Aux origines de la phénoménologie et de la philosophie analytique, chap. 
5, Presses universitaires de France, Paris 2001 (« Epitméthée »), p. 131-168, p. 164. 
69  M. ANTONELLI, Franz Brentano et l’‘inexistence intentionnelle’, p. XXXIX. W. SAUER, Die Einheit der 
Intentionalitätskonzeption bei Brentano, p. 6-7 and p. 9 apparently admits the reality of the centaur too. G. FRÉCHETTE, Deux 
concepts d'intentionnalité dans la Psychologie de Brentano, p. 67, says that the unicorn is a reality (see also G. FRÉCHETTE, 
Brentano’s Thesis (Revisited)); this is also affirmed in R. M. CHISHOLM, W. BAUMGARTNER, Einleitung der Herausgeber, p. XIV 
(transl. Müller, p. XX). 
70 M. ANTONELLI, Franz Brentano et l’‘inexistence intentionnelle’, p. 479.  
71 W. SAUER, Die Einheit der Intentionalitätskonzeption bei Brentano, p. 7 et p. 9, M. ANTONELLI, Die Deskriptive Psychologie 
von Anton Marty, p. XXXIX. 
72 F. BRENTANO, Wahrheit und Evidenz, p. 48 (transl. CHISHOLM, POLITZER, FISCHER, p. 29). See W. SAUER, Die Einheit 
der Intentionalitätskonzeption bei Brentano, p. 6. 
73 By the way, the mistake of the first interpretation would be to superimpose reality and existence and to believe that an 
alteration of the object implies an alteration of the quantifier (See O. T. KENT, Brentano and the Relational View of Consciousness, 
p. 32, W. SAUER, Die Einheit der Intentionalitätskonzeption bei Brentano, p. 7-8, G. FRÉCHETTE, Deux concepts d'intentionnalité dans 
la Psychologie de Brentano, p. 73-74). As we saw, even Chrudzimski, who is perfectly aware of the difference between 
modified objects and modified modes of being, concludes nonetheless that Brentano’s intentional object implies both of them. 
74 M. ANTONELLI, Franz Brentano et l’‘inexistence intentionnelle’, p. 479.  
75 For a distinction between the ontological and the psychological point of view in Brentano’s philosophy, see M. 
ANTONELLI, Seiendes, Bewusstsein, Intentionalität im Frühwerk von Franz Brentano, p. 267. 
76 See F. BRENTANO, Wahrheit und Evidenz, p. 31 (transl. CHISHOLM, POLITZER, FISCHER, p. 18-19), discussed specially in 
O. T. KENT, Brentano and the Relational View of Consciousness, p. 29-31, but also in W. SAUER, Die Einheit der 
Intentionalitätskonzeption bei Brentano, p. 2 and M. ANTONELLI, Die Deskriptive Psychologie von Anton Marty, p. XXXVIII. A similar 
analysis is to be found in L.L. MCALISTER, Brentano’s Epistemology. 
16 
 
as existing or not existing. [Therefore, ‘i]ntentional inexistence’ and ‘immanent 
objectivity’ do not denote an ontological category. They are used as ontologically 
neutral ways of saying that something is an object of a mental act.77  
 Thus, according to the defenders of the second interpretation, the initially quoted text from the 
Descriptive Psychology is not about a non-real intentional object containing a real transcendent thing, but 
about a non-real correlate containing a real intentional object 78 . The intentional object of the 
presentation is the real colour; the correlate is the non-real seen-colour given through inner perception 
and containing the real intentional colour « as a part to be obtained from it by modifying distinction ». 
According to Antonelli, with outer and inner perception, we have two different « perspectives » of 
consciousness. Outer perception is « transitive » and is « directed toward the intentional object », 
whereas inner perception is « reflexive » and is « directed toward itself »79. From the transitive point of 
view, an object, for example a colour, is given as independent of consciousness (although this 
independence does not imply its existence). From the reflexive point of view, a correlate, for example a 
seen-colour, is given as dependent on consciousness. Since it is correlative to the act, it always exists 
with it, and as a non-real entity. This twofold perspectival structure is inspired by Aristotle.. In the 
Metaphysics, Aristotle says enigmatically that sight is not related to « that of which it is the sight » (i.e. it 
is not related to a seen-x) – « though of course it is true to say this » –, but to « colour »80. Brentano 
would have taken this text and reinterpreted it in the context of his theory of outer and inner 
perception81. As Hedwig, Antonelli and de Libera noticed, Brentano’s interpretation of the Aristotelian 
relatives is inspired by Aquinas’ reading of the Stagirite82. Aquinas considers that knowledge and 
sensation are really related to things, whereas the things are not really related to them. Nevertheless, the 
intellect « apprehends [things] as the terms of the relation », so that, considering them as relata, it 
establishes a relation of reason from them to knowledge and sensation83. According to de Libera, the 
relation of reason is not intrinsic to the things toward which knowledge or sensation are directed, but 
extrinsic84. Brentano’s twofold perspectivist theory is similar: in inner perception, consciousness is 
acquainted with a mental act and a correlate. The correlate is not the primary object. It is a modified 
object, the extrinsic relational product of a reflexive modifying apprehension of the object (just as for 
Aquinas the relation of reason is extrinsic to the thing, distinct from it, and is a product of an intellective 
apprehension). In spite of the fact that the primary object is given as independent from the point of view 
of outer perception, the psychologist has to demodify the correlate in order to get access to the 
independent object, since descriptive psychology is done through inner perception. 
 Such an interpretation is continuist. It does not consider reism as an abandonment of the « half 
                                                      
77 O. T. KENT, Brentano and the Relational View of Consciousness, p. 44 and p. 33. See M. ANTONELLI, Franz Brentano et 
l’‘inexistence intentionnelle’, p. 483-484, who agrees with this interpretation. We think that this interpretation is close to 
Sauer’s.  
78 W. SAUER, Die Einheit der Intentionalitätskonzeption bei Brentano, p. 12-14, M. ANTONELLI, Die Deskriptive Psychologie von 
Anton Marty, p. XLI-XLIII.  
79 M. ANTONELLI, Seiendes, Bewusstsein, Intentionalität im Frühwerk von Franz Brentano, p. 398. 
80 ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics (ed. Ross), 1021a33-1021b2; The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation (vol. 
2), ed. by J. BARNES, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1984, p. 1613. 
81 M. ANTONELLI, Seiendes, Bewusstsein, Intentionalität im Frühwerk von Franz Brentano, p. 390-395. 
82 K. HEDWIG, Über das intentionale Korrelatenpaar, p. 57 n. 12 and p. 58 n. 23, M. ANTONELLI, Franz Brentano et 
l’‘inexistence intentionnelle’, p. 484 n. 48, A. DE LIBERA, Le direct et l'oblique: sur quelques aspects antiques et médiévaux de la théorie 
brentanienne des relatifs, p. 10-13. 
83 THOMAS AQUINAS, S. Th. Ia, q. 13, a. 7. 
84 A. DE LIBERA, Le direct et l'oblique: sur quelques aspects antiques et médiévaux de la théorie brentanienne des relatifs, p. 12. 
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existing » intentional objects, since this kind of objects has never existed. According to the second 
interpretation, in order to understand what reism entails with respect to the Brentanian theory of 
intentionality, it is important to consider Brentano’s theory of relatives85. For Brentano, relations are 
not polyadic predicates (aRb). When a and b are related, it means that two correlatives occur, namely r1b 
and r2a (for example bigger-than-b and smaller-than-a), which are ascribed to the respective relata a and 
b. In the case of the intentional relation, Brentano understands the situation differently. He follows 
Aristotle, who says that the knowable and the sensible are not related by themselves to knowledge and 
sensation, but are so because knowledge and sensation are related to them86. For Brentano, this would 
mean that in the case of intentionality, the correlatives are not thinks-of-b (r1b) and thought-of-by-a (r2a), 
but thinks-of-b (r1b) and b-is-thought-of-by (br2), which means that both these predicates are ascribed to a, 
the thinker, the only thing necessary for the thinking to occur (br2 says nothing more than r1b)
87.  
 






When a thinks of b and b is thought of by a, it does not mean that b exists. In other words, it is possible 
to think of objects which do not exist. And this has always been the case in Brentanian psychology, since, 
just as the centaur does not exist, there is « for the Brentano of 1874 no sense-qualities, no colours, 
sounds etc. in the physical world »88. The only difference is that reism entails the abandonment of the 
existence of the non-real correlate b-is-thought-of-by (br2). Since reism does not admit the existence of 
non-real entities, this correlate cannot exist anymore. This would be the reason why Brentano says, 
during a certain period, that the intentional relation is not a relation in the strict sense.  
 Thus, for the discontinuist interpretation, the relational aspect of intentionality is lost because the 
« half existence » of the intentional object is denied. By contrast, the continuist interpretation considers 
that the relational aspect is lost because the existence of the correlate (a part of the secondary object), is 
denied; as for the primary, intentional object, it has always been the case that it could be non-existent. 
Nevertheless, according to the continuist interpretation, the later theory of the « etwas Relativliches » is 
not the last Brentanian theory of the intentional relation. Indeed, in a text of 1915 published in The 
Theory of Categories, Brentano admits relatives without correlatives. He considers that just as for all 
                                                      
85 We will here follow the analyses of W. SAUER, Die Einheit der Intentionalitätskonzeption bei Brentano, p. 21-25. See also 
L.L. MCALISTER, Brentano’s Epistemology, p. 152-153. 
86 ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics (ed. Ross), 1021a29-30. 
87 A. DE LIBERA, Le direct et l'oblique: sur quelques aspects antiques et médiévaux de la théorie brentanienne des relatifs, p. 6, p. 13. 
De Libera remarks that since, even before reism, the thinking of A and the thought-A didn’t imply the existence of A or of a 
« half existing » A, adverbialism has always been at work in Brentano’s theory of intentionality (see ibid., p. 21-22). 


























relative determinations (relative Bestimmungen), which are real accidents of their subjects, the relative 
determination thinks-of-b (r1b) can occur even when nothing else exists. The only constraint is to co-
present b in modo obliquo89.  
 
2. Marty: from “immanent objects” to “mental assimilation” 
Marty is a philosopher of language and his contribution to the field is known as a descriptive theory of 
meaning (deskriptive Bedeutungslehre). For its essential part, however, the elucidation of linguistic meaning 
pertains to the philosophy of mind. Meaning is analysed in terms of speakers’ intentions primarily aimed 
at triggering psychic phenomena in hearers90. Under normal circumstances, when you say “Socrates 
exists”, you primarily intend that a hearer judges that Socrates exists; which means, according to the 
Brentanian-Martyian non-propositional theory of judgment91, that a hearer accepts the object presented 
in the presentation “Socrates”. Consequently, at the core of the elucidation of linguistic meaning lies the 
question of what it means for a subject to think of an object, or to form a judgment about it – in short: 
the theory of intentionality plays a crucial role in Marty’s philosophy of language. 
Marty changed his mind on the question of how exactly intentionality (or the so-called intentionale 
Beziehung) is to be accounted for92. He began by holding a theory which, he believed, was faithful to 
Brentano’s conception as exposed in the Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint of 1874 as well as in the 
lectures given in the years 1887-1891 and published only in 1982 under the title Descriptive Psychology93. 
Partly following Brentano’s early insight that one should get rid of all non-real entities 94 , he 
progressively came to the conclusion that the category of the so-called “immanent objects” of psychic 
phenomena generated more difficulties than it was supposed to resolve, and thus should be eliminated. 
                                                      
89 F. BRENTANO, Kategorienlehre, p. 169 and p. 174 (transl. CHISHOLM and GUTERMAN, p. 127 and p. 131). See W. SAUER, 
Die Einheit der Intentionalitätskonzeption bei Brentano, p. 21 and p. 24-25. 
90 On Marty’s philosophy of language, see S. RAYNAUD, Anton Marty, Filosofo del Linguaggio: Uno strutturalismo presaussuriano, 
La goliardica editrice, Roma, 1982; K. MULLIGAN (ed.), Mind, Meaning and Metaphysics. The Philosophy and Theory of Language 
of Anton Marty, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1990; ID., Marty’s philosophical grammar, in ID. (ed.), Mind, Meaning and Metaphysics..., 
pp. 11-27; P. SPINICCI, Il significato e la forma linguistica. Pensiero, esperienza e linguaggio nella filosofia di Anton Marty, Franco 
Angeli, Milano, 1991; B. SMITH, Austrian Philosophy, ch. 4; L. Albertazzi, Anton Marty (1847-1914), in EAD., M. LIBARDI, 
R. POLI (eds.), The School of Franz Brentano, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1996, pp. 83-108; D. FISETTE, G. FRÉCHETTE, Le legs de 
Brentano, in E. HUSSERL, C. STUMPF, C. EHRENFELS, A. MEINONG, K. TWARDOWSKI, A. MARTY, A l’école de Brentano, de 
Würzbourg à Vienne, D. FISETTE, G. FRÉCHETTE (éds), Vrin, Paris, 2007, (“Bibliotthèque des textes philosophiques”), pp. 13-
160; L. CESALLI, Martys philosophische Position innerhalb der österreichischen Tradition, “Brentano Studien” 12 (2006/2009), 
pp. 121-181; R. ROLLINGER, Philosophy of Language and other Matters in the Works of Anton Marty, Rodopi, Amsterdam, 2010; 
K. Mulligan, Wittgenstein et ses prédécesseurs austro-allemands, “Philosophiques” 38/1 (2011), pp. 5-69 2011; K. Mulligan, 
Wittgenstein et la philosophie austro-allemande, Vrin, Paris 2012, ch. 3 and 5; L. CESALLI, Anton Marty’s Intentionalist Theory of 
Meaning, in D. FISETTE, G. FRÉCHETTE (eds.), Themes from Brentano. 
91 On Marty’s and Brentano’s non-propositional (or “idiopathic”) theory of judgment, see K. MULLIGAN, Judgings: Their 
Parts and Counterparts, “Topoi” VI.1, suppl. 2 (1989), pp. 117-148; R. ROLLINGER, Austrian Theories of Judgment: Bolzano, 
Brentano, Meinong, and Husserl, in A. CHRUDZIMSKI, W. HUEMER (Hrsg.), Phenomenology and Analysis: Essays on Central European 
Philosophy, Ontos, Frankfurt, 2004, pp. 57-284. 
92  On Marty’s theory of intentionality, see A. CHRUDZIMSKI, Die Intentionalitätstheorie Anton Martys, “Grazer 
Philosophische Studien” 57 (1999), pp. 175-214. 
93 F. BRENTANO, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, ed. by L. L. MCALISTER, transl. by A.C. RUNCURELLO, D.B. 
TERRELL, and L. L. MCALISTER, with a new introduction by P. SIMONS, Routledge, London, 2009; F. BRENTANO, Descriptive 
Psychology, transl. by B. MÜLLER, Routledge, London, 1995.  
94 See the letter to Marty bearing the date of the 24.11.1893, quoted in A. CHRUDZIMSKI, Die Ontologie Franz Brentanos, 
p. 199. In this letter, Brentano speaks of his own “former doctrine” as well as of an “essential reform of ‘his’ former 
psychologistic views” regarding the existence of entia rationis (i.e. non-real entities cum fundamento in re). Brentano’s new – i.e. 
post 1903 – psychology is founded on the abandonment of entia rationis. Now, in this letter, entia rationis are described as all 
having an “intentional moment”, for example “thought-about”.  
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This change of mind certainly occurred before March 1906, and possibly as early as 190595. We shall 
give a more detailed chronology of the interrelatedness of Marty’s philosophical evolution under the 
combined influence of Brentano and Husserl at the beginning of section 2.2, below. 
The rejection of non-real, mental entities subsisting over and above the mental acts and functioning 
as their correlates—what he will call immanent objects—is the essential feature of Marty’s later 
philosophy. Against Brentano’s radical rejection of irrealia altogether, Marty insists that some of them (e.g. 
relations, states of affairs or Urteilsinhalte) must be acknowledged for the sake of scientific objectivity96: 
the Abkehr vom Nichrealen was total or exhaustive on Brentano’s side, but only partial or selective on 
Marty’s. Thus, the ontology of the later Marty divides the existant into two realms: what exists and is 
real (substances and their accidents), and what exists without being real (states of affairs, relations, 
collectives, possibilia)97; but nothing of what exists and is non-real is an immanent object. 
The post-1906 Marty maintains that intentionality is a kind of relation (a relation he calls ideelle 
Verähnlichung or mental assimilation), and that relations have to be taken ontologically seriously as 
existing, non-real entities98. In spite of the talk (“… wie man sich ausdrückt…”) of relations subsisting 
“between” their terms, however, relations are not to be conceived of as “bridges”: if A and B exist and 
are both blue, the relation of equichromy of A and B is nothing existing between A and B; rather, there 
are two relational determinations, one in A and one in B. In what follows, we shall describe Marty’s 
                                                      
95 See Marty’s letter to Brentano of the 02.03.1906, in F. BRENTANO, Die Abkehr vom Nichtrealen, p. 148-151 (the passage 
is discussed below, section 2.2, n. 103). For the possible date of 1905 as terminus ante quem, see A. MARTY, Über Annahmen 
(Ein kritischer Beitrag zur Psychologie, namentlich der deskriptiven), in J. EISEMEIER, A. KASTIL, O. KRAUS (Hrsg.), Anton Marty. 
Gesammelte Schriften, II.2, Max Niemeyer, Halle a. S., 1920, pp. 3-56 (p. 21). 
96 See for example the following passage taken from Marty’s last work, Raum und Zeit, Aus dem Nachlass des Verfassers 
herausgegeben von J. EISENMEIER, A. KASTIL, O. KRAUS, Niemeyer, Halle a. S., 1916, I, § 26, pp. 155-156: “Die 
Objektivität ist hier – wie auch Brentano zugibt – identisch mit dem, was man Richtigkeit des psychischen Verhaltens zum 
Gegenstand oder der Behandlung desselben nennt, und davon ist keine andere Erklärung möglich als: sie bestehe in einer 
ideellen Adäquation zu etwas (nicht bloß mental und subjektiv, sondern objektiv, d. h. unabhängig von dem Bewusstsein 
Gegebenen), und dies ist eben beim Urteil der Sachverhalt […], beim Interesse der Wert bzw. Unwert des Gegenstandes, 
auf welchen das Urteil bzw. Interesse sich bezieht und welcher zugleich der Gegenstand des dem einen und andern Verhalten 
notwendig zugrunde liegenden Vorstellens ist. Indem aber dem unabhängig vom Bewusstsein Gegebenen diese wirkliche 
oder mögliche Adäquation zu einem gewissen Urteil zukommt, ist etwas gegeben, was zwar ist, aber m. Er. nicht real ist. Ich 
sage wirkliche oder mögliche Adäquation, denn der Sachverhalt […] ist ja nicht bloß gegeben, so lange ein Urteil darüber 
gefällt […] wird (sonst stecken wir wieder im vollsten Subjektivismus), sondern auch, wenn diese psychischen Beziehungen 
fehlen. Genug, dass sie möglich und, wenn sie da sind, ihrerseits in ideeller Übereinstimmung mit jenem objektiv Gegebenen 
stehen.”  
97 See A. MARTY, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie. Erster Band, Niemeyer, 
Halle a. S., 1908, § 66, pp. 317-321. On Marty’s ontology, see B. SMITH, Austrian Philosophy, ch. 4. Formally, the real is 
characterized as something which is causally active and comes into being and passees away autonoumously, whereas the non-
real is causally inert and is existentially dependent of the real (it has a mere Mitwerden and Mitvergehen). 
98 For the objective character of relations, see A. MARTY, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und 
Sprachphilosophie, § 71, p. 336: “Wäre es richtig, dass – wie man oft hört – die Relationen etwas Subjektives, d.h. nur in der 
Vorstellung Existierendes seien, dann würde auch von ihnen gelten, dass sie Fiktionen wären. Doch beruht diese Meinung auf 
Irrtum und Missverständnis. Die Begriffe von Relationen sind Begriffe von etwas Objektivem, und sie sind aus Erfahrungen 
geschöpft so gut wie die von absoluten Bestimmungen. Nur eben, im Unterschied von diesen, im Hinblick auf eine Mehrheit 
von Gegenständen zwischen denen – wie man sich ausdrückt – die Relation besteht.” (see also ibid., § 113, p. 468-469, as 
well as A. MARTY, Zur Sprachphilosophie. Die ‘logische’, ‘lokalistische’ und andere Kasustheorien, Halle, M. Niemeyer, 1910, 
pp. 65-68). For the non-real character of relations, see A. MARTY, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik 
und Sprachphilosophie, § 66, p. 321: “Was vom Kollektiv, das gilt aber weiter auch von den Relationen, die man als nichtreale 
zu bezeichnen pflegt, wie von der Gleichheit und Verschiedenheit und von anderem, was ihnen verwandt und untergeordnet 
ist (wie die Ähnlichtkeit, der Gegensatz und Abstand) oder auch bloss analog (wie die intentionale Relation). Wohl ist die 
letztere eine Folge von etwas Realem, und so sind es oft direkt, oft indirekt auch die anderen; aber niemals sind sie in sich 
selbst eine Realität. Sie wirken nicht und werden nicht gewirkt. Ihr Werden und Vergehen begleitet das Entstehen und 
Vergehen dessen, zwischen dem die Gleichheit und Verschiedenheit sich findet, und dieses ist entweder selbst ein Reales 
oder seinerseits Folge des Gewirktwerdens oder Vergehens eines Realen […].”  
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mature conception of intentionality by considering successively the following two questions: i) What is 
the gist of Marty’s later theory – in other words: what does ‘ideelle Verähnlichung’ exactly mean? 
ii) Which is the place of this theory within Marty’s philosophical development (in particular, with 
respect to the influence of Brentano and Husserl)? 
2.1. What does ‘ideelle Verähnlichung’ mean? (1908) 
Before tackling the question of the exact meaning of the expression ‘mental assimilation’ (MA), we 
shall briefly comment two paradigmatic texts expressing Marty’s earlier and later conceptions of 
intentionality. The first is taken from the Deskriptive Psychologie, a text recently published on the base of a 
Mitschrift by Alfred Kastil of the eponymous lecture given by Marty in the winter term of 1893-1894: 
The psychic events or states all have in common, and spectacularly diverge from the 
physical ones, in that each of them has an object, in other words, in that they are a 
consciousness. When a psychic act occurs in us, something different from it is present 
to us in a totally peculiar way which the Scholastics called ‘objective inexistence’ or 
‘mental inexistence’ (we shall use the latter expression). E.g. in hearing, a sound is 
present to us, etc. Every psychic act thus has an object as its correlate. An object of 
consciousness belongs to consciousness as a correlate, something of which one 
becomes conscious, and such an immanent object is found in every psychic act.99 
This is a clear expression of a correlational theory of intentionality: thinking always involves a 
correlation between a mental act or state and an immanent object: whenever a presentation, a judgment, 
or an emotion exists, there also exists an immanent object which is its correlate. Such is Marty’s 
understanding of the moto “kein Vorstellen ohne ein Vorgestelltes”100.  
As for a square formulation of Marty’s later position, one can consider the following passage from the 
Untersuchungen of 1908 as exemplary: 
We discovered the true meaning of the theory according to which every presenting 
(or every consciousness whatsoever) is a respect to an object in that, that each 
<consciousness> is an actual or possible mental assimilation to something (which is 
precisely called an object).101  
                                                      
99 A. MARTY, Deskriptive Psychologie, hg. v. M. ANTONELLI und J. C. MAREK, mit einer Einleitung von M. ANTONELLI, 
Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg, 2011, I, § 1, p. 9: “Die psychischen Ereignisse oder Zustände haben alle miteinander 
gemein und unterscheiden sich von den physischen in eklatanter Weise dadurch, dass jedes von ihnen ein Objekt hat, mit 
anderen Worten, dass sie ein Bewusstsein sind. Indem ein psychischer Akt in uns vorgeht, ist uns etwas anderes als er selber 
in einer ganz eigentümlichen Weise gegenwärtig, einer Weise, welche die Scholastiker die ‘objektive Inexistenz’ oder ‘mentale 
Inexistenz’ (wir werden den letzten Ausdruck gebrauchen) genannt haben. Z.B. beim Hören ist uns ein Ton gegenwärtig usw. 
Jeder psychische Akt hat also ein Objekt als sein Korrelat. Zum Bewusstsein gehört als Korrelat ein Bewusstseinsgegenstand, 
etwas, dessen man sich bewusst wird, und ein solches immanentes Objekt findet sich bei jedem psychischen Akt.” Marty had 
been giving such a lecture each year since 1889.  
100See for example this passage from Marty’s 5th article on subjectless sentences (1894): “Der immanente Gegenstand 
existiert, so oft der betreffende Bewusstseinsakt wirklich ist. Denn es gibt kein Bewusstsein ohne ein ihm immanentes Objekt; 
das eine ist ein Korrelat des anderen.” – A. MARTY, Über subjectlose Sätze und das Verhältnis der Grammatik zu Logik und 
Psychologie, Vierter bis siebter Artikel, in J. EISEMEIER, A. KASTIL, O. KRAUS (Hrsg.), Anton Marty. Gesammelte Schriften, II.1, 
Max Niemeyer, Halle a. S., 1918, pp. 116-307 (p. 165). 
101 A. MARTY, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie, § 101, p. 421: “Wir fanden 
den wahren Sinn der Lehre, dass jedes Vorstellen (resp. Bewusstsein überhaupt) eine Objektsbeziehung sei, darin, dass jedes 
eine wirkliche oder mögliche ideel<l>e Verähnlichung mit etwas (was eben Objekt genannt wird) sei.” This passage – as 
well as many others in the Untersuchungen – entails that MA does not only apply to presentations, but also to the (only) two 
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No more talk about an immanent object or a correlation as essential elements in the description of 
what it means for a mental act to have an object102. The newcomers in this later theory are the concept 
of mental assimilation and the modality of the merely possible (the conditional or counter-factual): 
‘having an object’ does not mean anymore something like ‘having an immanent object as correlate’, but 
rather ‘being (possibly or actually) mentally assimilated to an object’.  
In section 2.2, we shall sketch the way which, according to us, lead from the theory of the Deskriptive 
Psychologie to the one of the Untersuchungen. For the time being, though, we shall see how Marty 
introduces and understands the intriguing notion of mental assimilation (henceforth ‘MA’).  
To the best of our knowledge, the first occurrence überhaupt of the expression ‘ideelle Verähnlichung’ 
(although in a disjoint form) is to be found in Marty’s letter to Brentano of March, 2nd, 1906: 
What really exists is the real psychic process and, as a non-real consequence, a certain 
mental similitude (a being-equated, an adequation, a conformity) of the soul. 
Therefore in a certain sense one can call this psychic process a possible or actual 
assimilation.103 [Italics ours]  
At that time, the manuscript of the first volume of the Untersuchungen (to be published in 1908) was 
practically achieved – the lecture of 1904 entitled Grundfragen der Sprachphilosophie104 is a faithful abstract 
of the first 300 pages of the book, and the letter Marty wrote to his editor at the end of Fall 1906105 
clearly shows that the totality of the opus (eventually comprising some 764 pages) had been achieved by 
then106. Nonetheless, the letter of 1906 remains silent on the nature of MA and, in particular, on the 
relation between MA and what one commonly understands under ‘similitude’ (Ähnlichkeit). Things look 
different in the opus of 1908. 
Marty introduces the notion of MA in the part of his Untersuchungen dedicated to a description of the 
“matter” (Stoff) of the meaning of so-called “autosemantic” linguistic means, and more precisely, of 
“names” (or Vorstellungssuggestive)107. The central part of this section of the Untersuchungen108 consists in 
                                                                                                                                                                         
other classes of psychic phenomena acknowledged by Brentano and Marty, namely judgments and emotions (or phenomena 
of interest).  
102 Note that Marty uses here ‘Beziehung’ and not ‘Relation’ (or ‘Korrelation’). We translate ‘Beziehung’ by ‘respect’, for 
there is a systematic distinction to be made between the meanings of ‘Relation’ and ‘Beziehung’: the former has a narrow sense, 
and refers to a correlation; the latter has a broader sense (a Relation is a Beziehung) which extends to looser kinds of 
connections than correlations (typically, as we shall see, to what the later Marty calls ‘relative determinations’, ‘relative 
Bestimmungen’).  
103 A. MARTY, letter to Brentano of the 2nd of March 1906, in F. BRENTANO, Die Abkehr vom Nichtrealen, p. 149: “Was 
wirklich existiert, ist der reale psychische Vorgang und als nichtreale Folge eine gewisse ideelle Ähnlichkeit (Angeglichensein, 
Adäquatheit, Konformität) der Seele. Man kann darum in gewissem Sinne den psychischen Vorgang eine mögliche oder 
wirkliche Verähnlichung nennen.” [Italics ours].  
104 A. MARTY, Grundfragen der Sprachphilosophie (1904), in O. FUNKE (Hg.), Psyche und Sprachstruktur (Anton Marty, 
Nachgelassene Schriften aus “Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie”, I), 
A. Franke, Bern, 1940, pp. 75-117.    
105 The letter is published in O. FUNKE, Planskizzen und Entwürfe. Zur Genesis von A. Martys “Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung 
der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie”, in ID. (Hg.), Psyche und Sprachstruktur, pp. 46-73 (pp. 49-52).  
106 In two footnotes of his 1905 review of Meinong’s Über Annahmen, Marty already refers to his Untersuchungen with 
respect to the theory of the relative determination – see A. MARTY, Über Annahmen, § 5, p. 21, n. 1 and § 14, p. 47, n. 1.    
107 According to Marty, language can be analyzed in terms of matter and form at different levels. At a first level, linguistic 
means have a matter (their meaning) and a form (internal, i.e. intelligible, or external, i.e. sensible) which consists in all the 
elements “containing” the meaning (or matter), just like a jar is said to be the form of the liquid matter it contains. At a 
second level, meaning itself can be hylemorphically analyzed: the matter of meaning is expressed by so-called “autosemantic” 
linguistic means (sentences and names, i.e. means which are capable of expressing complete psychic phenomena), whereas 
the form of meaning is expressed by so-called “synsemantic” expressions (linguistic expressions which are unable to express 
complete psychic phenomena) – see L. CESALLI, Martys philosophische Position innerhalb der österreichischen Tradition, section 1.  
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virulent criticisms against the thesis – formerly held by Marty himself, prominently in his Deskriptive 
Psychologie – that psychic phenomena have immanent objects. Having distinguished the three linguistic 
functions of names – indicating, steering, and naming109 – Marty dismisses the attempt to account for the 
distinction between what names mean and what they name by stating that names mean immanent objects, 
and name transcendent objects110. There simply are no immanent objects, therefore such fictions cannot 
possibly be what names mean. Nonetheless, some philosophers, as Carl Stumpf or the pre-1906-Marty 
accept (or accepted) their existence. How can this be?  
The post-1906-Marty gives a twofold explanation for such a philosophical mistake. On the one hand, 
it has to do with semantics: it is a manifestation of what Marty calls the “figurative inner linguistic form” 
or figürliche innere Sprachform; on the other, it is linked with a fundamental feature of our inner life: the 
fact that psychic phenomena are indeed relational. Before turning to this explanation, however, we shall 
quickly mention the arguments Marty gives in 1908 (and later) against the existence of immanent objects. 
Marty begins by showing that if there are immanent objects, they can only be mental entities truly 
existing besides transcendent ones: the concept of existence is univocal and it makes no sense to say that 
the very same entity has two ways of existing, one transcendent and the other immanent111. This being 
said, the existence of immanent objects turns out to be highly problematic112: first, it would entail that 
whatever is presented, judged or loved/hated is something immanent113; second, it would lead one to 
accept any statement as being necessarily true, since any judgment would be correlated to an existing 
immanent object114; third, even if one would conceive of immanent objects as not being the targets of 
mental acts, but only a kind of mediators towards transcendent objects, one would face the difficulty of 
explaining how a merely presented X (i.e. an immanent X) could plausibly lead to a real X (i.e. a 
transcendent X) since those two objects would not have anything in common, besides a (thoroughly 
equivocal) name: the immanent object would be a non-real entity existentially depending not on the 
transcendent object it is supposed to represent, but on the thinking subject’s mental acts115. For all those 
reasons, then, immanent objects should be rejected. 
                                                                                                                                                                         
108 The §§ 89-99, pp. 385-417. 
109 A name indicates a presentation in a speaker (this is Kundgabe) and thereby steers the inner life of a hearer so that he 
forms an analogue presentation (this is Bedeutung), a presentation by means of which an object is named (this is Nennung). 
Names share their first two semantic functions with the other types of autosemantic expressions, namely statements and 
expressions of interest (Emotive) – see L. CESALLI, F. GOUBIER, Anton Marty on Naming (Nennen) and Meaning (Bedeutung). A 
comparison with Medieval Supposition Theory, in C. KANN, B. LÖWE, C. RODE, S. UCKELMAN (eds.), Modern Views of Medieval 
Logic [forthcoming in the Bibliotheca of the “Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales”].   
110 For Marty ‘to be a transcendent object’ means i) ‘to be the target object of a mental act’, and ii) to exist (or not) 
independently of any mental act. In other words, ‘to be a transcendent object’ means ‘to be an object tout court’, what Marty, 
as we will see, often calls ein Gegenstand schlechtweg. This is how Twardowski introduces his concept of Gegenstand (as opposed 
to Inhalt) – see K. TWARDOWSKI, Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen, Alfred Hölder, Wien, 1894, p. 40 (see 
as well O.T. KENT, Brentano and the relational view of consciousness, p. 11, n. 50).  
111 See A. MARTY, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie, § 92, pp. 392-394. 
According to Marty, ‘to exist’ means ‘to be acceptable in a true judgment’ which, in turn, means something like ‘to be what 
is presented by the presentation expressed by the grammatical subject of a possible true statement’.  
112 Marty’s argumentation is reconstructed and discussed in A. CHRUDZIMSKI, Die Intentionalitätstheorie Anton Martys, 
op. cit. 
113 See A. MARTY, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie, § 93, pp. 394-395.   
114 See A. MARTY, Raum und Zeit, § 12, p. 57. 
115 A. MARTY, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie, § 93, p. 395: “Aber ist es 
nicht ebenso eine Täuschung, zu meinen, dass der sog. mentale Gegenstand das Bewusstsein vom wirklichen vermittle? Ist 
doch der Gedanke an eine solche stellvertretende oder vermittelnde Rolle von Hause aus von der Voraussetzung getragen, 
dass der ein wahrhafter Doppelgänger des andern sei, während eben der mentale Gegenstand, wenn er wahrhaft existierte, 
etwas wesentlich anderes wäre als der wirkliche, etwas, was nur äquivok dessen Namen trüge. Auch soll er ja gegeben sein 
können, während der wirkliche fehlt, wo also kein Bewusstsein des wirklichen im Sinne einer Korrelation der Seele zu ihm 
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As for the explanation of the fact that many philosophers were nonetheless tempted to (and did) 
accept immanent objects, it runs as follows: one is mislead to such a position by the (semantic) fact that 
in order to understand the true sentence ‘an object is presented in a presentation’, a presentation of a 
subject-object correlation is required; not as what is meant by the sentence though, but only as an auxiliary, 
figurative presentation  whose function is merely to facilitate the link between the pronounced words and 
the intended meaning116. What the sentence does mean, by contrast, is the (psychological) fact that 
whenever a subject has a presentation of an existing object, there is indeed an actual correlation between 
the thinking subject and that object. But the whole point is that such an actual correlation is the case only 
when the object exists, and thus, (by far) not always: 
It is an old popular way of speaking to say that the similar is contained in what is 
similar to it according to the similitude. […] In this metaphorical sense, one may also 
say that the presented is in the presenting subject, and one may use the talk of a 
mental or immanent existence of the object in the mind of the thinking subject as an 
image of the inner linguistic form, <an image> for the fact of this mental similitude 
of the thinking subject with his object, <a mental similitude> which is the case 
whenever this <object> exists. […] What truly exists is not a peculiarly modified 
duplicate of the real object which would inhabitate us, but only the real psychic 
process from which, as a consequence, and under certain circumstances, follows the 
correlation of a mental similitude with something else, something which exists 
independently of this process; under certain different circumstances, however, only a 
relative determination <which is> akin to this correlation <follows from this real 
psychic process>. […] In that sense, but in that sense only, one can speak of a 
‘pseudoexistence’ of the immanent object. We do not have to do with another way 
of existing, but only with another way of apprehending <things> 
linguistically […].117     
To sum up: Marty gives several arguments against the existence of immanent objects, and also offers 
an explanation for the origin and tenacity of this philosophically pernicious idea. The explanation has to 
do with our way of talking about what effectively goes on in a thinking subject. When you present a tree, 
                                                                                                                                                                         
gegeben sein kann.” In a later passage of the Untersuchungen (§ 97, p. 410, n. 2), Marty labels immanent objects as “fiktive 
Doppelgänger” of real objects. See also the passage quoted below, n. 117. 
116 Those auxiliary presentations constitue the figurative inner linguistic form: “Die ‘innere Sprachform’ oder das Etymon 
eines Ausdrucksmittels ist eine Vorstellung, des als Band der Assoziation dient zwischen dem äußerlich wahrnehmbaren Zeichen 
und seiner Bedeutung, d.h. dem psychischen Inhalt, den es in dem Angeredeten erwecken will. Eine Ausdrucksform, welche 
ein Etymon oder eine innere Form besitzt, erweckt also zunächst gewisse Vorstellungen, die vom Redenden nicht eigentlich 
gemeint sind, sondern bloß den Beruf haben, im Hörer den Seeleninhalt (Vorstellungen, Urteile, Gefühle usw.), auf den es in 
Wahrheit abgesehen ist, herbeizuführen.” – A. MARTY Über subjectlose Sätze und das Verhältnis der Grammatik zu Logik und 
Psychologie, dritter Artikel (18849, in J. EISEMEIER, A. KASTIL, O. KRAUS (Hrsg.), Anton Marty. Gesammelte Schriften, II.1, Max 
Niemeyer, Halle a. S., 1918, pp. 62-101 (p. 67). 
117 A. MARTY, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie, § 99, pp. 415-416: “Es ist 
eine altbekannte, beliebte Redeweise zu sagen, das Ähnliche sei der Ähnlichkeit nach enthalten in dem ihm Ähnlichen. […] In 
diesem bildlichen Sinne mag man nun auch sagen, das Vorgestellte sei im Vorstellenden und mag man die Rede von einer 
mentalen oder immanenten Existenz des Objekts im Geiste des Denkenden als ein Bild der inneren Sprachform gebrauchen 
für die Tatsache jener ideellen Ähnlichkeit des Denkenden mit seinem Objekte, die gegeben ist, so oft dasselbe existiert. […] 
Was wirklich existiert, ist nicht ein uns innewohnender, eigentümlich modifizierter, Doppelgänger des wirklichen Objekts 
sondern nur der reale psychische Vorgang, an den sich als Folge unter Umständen die Korrelation einer ideellen Ähnlichkeit 
mit etwas anderem, unabhängig von diesem Vorgang Existierenden, knüpft, unter anderen Umständen aber auch bloß eine 
dieser Korrelation verwandte relative Bestimmung. […] In diesem Sinne, aber auch nur in diesem, kann von einer 
„Pseudoexistenz“ des immanenten Gegenstands die Rede sein. Es ist nicht eine andere Weise der Existenz, sondern nur eine 
andere Weise sprachlicher Auffassung […].”  
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you are having a tree as object of your act of presenting, that is, according to Marty: you are getting 
mentally assimilated to a tree – a situation in which, as a matter of fact, no immanent object is involved. 
Another way to express this idea consists in saying that intentionality is indeed a relational phenomenon, 
but not an essentially correlational one: 
In spite of the fact that, contrary to what one used to believe, it is not always the case 
that every consciousness is a subject-object relation in the sense of a correlation, 
<one can ask> nonetheless whether something akin to it does indeed exist, which 
offered the occasion to believe that such a correlation exists in any case?118 
 
As we know by now, the answer to this question is a clear ‘yes’: 
In the subject, there only exists the real process of presenting or a presenting as such. 
But, under certain circumstances, this mental similitude with the presented 
<object> can be attributed to this <real process or presenting as such>, and in that 
respect, one may precisely call the presenting a process of possible or actual mental 
assimilation or mental adequation to an object.119 [Last italics ours] 
“An object is in me as presented” or “is immanent to me” means: there exists a mind 
presenting this object, that is: a mind which, if this <object> exists, is mentally 
assimilated to it.120 
Having established why Marty rejects immanent objects and how he introduces his later notion of 
intentionality, let us now turn to the essential features of MA. Four key points can be extracted from 
Marty’s text. (i) MA is a relation, i.e. an existing non-real entity121. (ii) MA is holding between a thinking 
subject and an object, and we should then say that the subject and the object are the extremes or “terms” 
                                                      
118 A. MARTY, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie, § 95, p. 406: “Wenn auch 
eine Subjekt-Objektsbeziehung im Sinne einer Korrelation nicht – wie man glaubte – bei jedem Bewusstsein gegeben ist, ist 
nicht doch vielleicht etwas dem Verwandtes gegeben, was den Anlass bot, an die Existenz einer solchen Korrelation in allen 
Fällen zu glauben?” 
119 A. MARTY, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie, § 95, p. 406: “Es ist im 
Subjekt nur der reale Vorgang des Vorstellens oder ein Vorstellendes als solches gegeben. Aber ihm lässt sich unter 
Umständen jene ideelle Ähnlichkeit mit dem Vorgestellten zuschreiben und mit Rücksicht darauf mag man das Vorstellen 
geradezu einen Vorgang möglicher oder wirklicher ideeller Verähnlichung oder mentaler Adäquation mit einem Objekte nennen.” 
[Last italics ours]. 
120  A. MARTY, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie, § 99, p. 416: “‘Ein 
Gegenstand ist als vorgestellt im mir’ oder ‘mir immanent’ heißt: es existiert ein diesen Gegenstand Vorstellendes, d.h. ein 
ihm wenn er existiert, ideell Verähnlichtes.” Note the similarity of this last formulation with Brentano’s own way of 
presenting his “new” doctrine in 1911: “Denkt einer etwas, so muss zwar das Denkende, keineswegs aber das Objekt seines 
Denkens existieren […]. So ist denn das Denkende das einzige Ding, welches die psychische Beziehung verlangt. Der 
Terminus der sogenannten Relation muss gar nicht in Wirklichkeit gegeben sein. Man könnte darum zweifeln, ob hier 
wirklich etwas Relatives vorliege, und nicht vielmehr etwas in gewissem Betracht einem Relativen Ähnliches, was man darum 
als etwas ‘Relativliches’ bezeichnen könnte.” (F. BRENTANO, Von der Klassifikation der psychischen Phänomene, p. 134.  
121  On the necessity to acknowledge the existence of the intentional relation, see A. MARTY, Untersuchungen zur 
Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie, § 70, p. 333: “Eine nichtreale Relation ist zweifellos auch die, der 
Relation der Gleichheit entfernt verwandte, intentionale Relation, die eigentümliche ideelle Gleichheit oder Adäquation 
zwischen dem psychischen Vorgang und seinem Inhalt. Zu den Gründen, die wir schon bezüglich der Gleichheit im 
eigentlichen Sinne geltend machten, kann man hier noch die Frage hinzugesellen, zu welcher Klasse des Realen denn die 
ideelle Konformität zwischen der psychischen Funktion mit ihrem Inhalt zu rechnen wäre, falls sie als eine reale Bestimmung 
gelten sollte: ob zu der des Physischen oder zu der des Psychischen? Keine dieser Alternativen wird man ernstlich verteidigen 
wollen.”    
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of MA. (iii) MA is what Marty calls a “grounded relation” R, i.e. a relation which holds between the 
subject and the object in virtue of fundaments existing in both terms, for example: when I have a 
presentation of a red thing, I stand in a relationof MA to a red thing (the feature of my presentation 
which makes of it a presentation of a red thing and the individual redness of that thing are the 
fundaments of the MA in this precise case)122; note that MA is a symmetrical relation: it is perfectly true 
as well to say that the red thing stands in a relation of MA to me123. (iv) Like any other grounded relation, 
MA can exist in the form of an actual correlation (when both fundaments coexist), or in the form of a 
mere possible correlation or “relative determination”, when only one of the fundaments exists:      
For whom acquired the concept of an actual correlation by experiencing it, it is also possible 
to acquire on this base the concept of a possible or hypothetical one, <a correlation> which 
would subsist if the fundaments were given; and also <to acquire> the <concept> of the 
contribution which one or the other of the fundaments would pay to the relation, when it 
actually exists; and the <concept> of the ability to co-found and to ground a relation in this 
way, <an ability> which pertains to each of the fundaments, even if the further conditions 
and thereby the grounded relation they condition <together> are not actually given.  Such an 
ability is of course only something hypothetical or negative and as such, something thoroughly 
non-real. This means only that if besides the subsisting fundament the others exist as well, a 
certain relation necessarily is given with <them>; in other words: that the existence of the 
actually given fundament and that of certain other fundaments cannot be the case 
simultaneously without the relation being a fact as well. But this negative or hypothetical 
predicate truly and by all means pertains to the subsistent fundament, even when the other 
fundaments do not exist; and we shall call this – with an expression we occasionally used 
earlier – a relative determination.124 
                                                      
122 See A. MARTY, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie, § 97, pp. 408-409; on 
Marty’s theory of relations, see I. JOHANSSON, External, Internal and Grounded Relations, in ID., Ontological Investigations. An 
Inquiry into the Categories of Nature, Man and Society, Ontos, Frankfurt, 2004, pp. 110-123. Marty distinguishes “grounding” 
and “grounded” relations. The former are deprived of fundaments and hold between fundaments and their bearers or subjects 
(for example between you and your presentation of a red thing, between that thing and its particular redness); the latter hold 
between bearers of fundaments (between you and a red thing, in our example). The fundaments of grounded relations are 
“absolute determinations” (the fact that a thing is red is not relative to anything else), and they are real determinations as well 
(even if the red colour does not exist out there as I present it, there exists a real determination of the thing such that I perceive 
it as being red).    
123 See A. MARTY, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie, § 103, p. 432: “[…] ‘ein 
Objekt haben’ beim Vorstellen <heißt> oft nur: wenn das Betreffende wäre, wäre es für dieses Vorstellen Objekt, und 
umgekehrt kann auch von einem Objekt- oder Gegenstandsein im Sinne einer bloßen relativen Bestimmung gesprochen 
werden, indem damit bloß gesagt sein soll, dass wenn ein konformes Vorstellen gegeben wäre, dann eine Korrelation 
zwischen ihm und dem betreffenden x  oder y bestände.” 
124 A. MARTY, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie, § 97, p. 410-411: “Wer aber 
aus der Erfahrung einer wirklichen Korrelation den Begriff derselben gewonnen, der vermag sich auf Grund dessen auch 
denjenigen einer möglichen oder hypothetischen zu bilden, die bestände, wenn die Fundamente gegeben wären. Ebenso den 
Begriff des Beitrags, den das eine oder andere der Fundamente zur Relation, wenn sie wirklich ist, leistet, und den der 
Fähigkeit, eine Relation in dieser Weise mit zu bedingen und zu begründen, welche jedem der Fundamente zukommt, auch 
wenn die übrigen Mitbedingungen und damit die durch sie bedingte Relation nicht wirklich gegeben sind. Diese Fähigkeit ist 
freilich nur ein Hypothetikum oder Negativum und als solches etwas durchaus Nichtreales. Es ist ja damit bloß gesagt, dass, 
wenn außer dem bestehenden auch die anderen Fundamente gegeben sind, eine gewisse Relation notwendig mit gegeben ist, 
oder mit anderen Worten, dass die Existenz des tatsächlich gegebenen Fundaments und die gewisser anderer Fundamente 
nicht zugleich bestehen kann, ohne dass die Relation gleichfalls Tatsache ist. Aber dieses negative oder hypothetische Prädikat 
kommt dem bestehenden Fundament doch in aller Wahrheit zu, auch wenn die anderen Fundamente nicht existieren, und 
wir wollen es (mit einem schon früher gelegentlich verwendeten Terminus) eine relative Bestimmung nennen.” A relative 
determination is a negative predicate because it only exists when there is no correlation; it is hypothetical because it involves the 
taking into account of a hypothesis: a relative determination exists because if both fundaments were to exist, then, necessarily, 
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For example, let us assume that a thinking subject (say, you), its act of presenting an object (say, 
Socrates), and Socrates all exist, such that you are now in a state of MA to Socrates (and this MA is de facto 
an actual correlation, something which automatically follows from the coexistence of your act of 
presenting Socrates and the existence of Socrates). Suppose, however, that a year later, you have a 
presentation of Socrates again, but that in the meantime, Socrates disappeared: you then stand in a state 
of MA to a merely possible object, which means that your state of MA is a merely possible C. In other 
words: Socrate non existente, your state of MA is not an actual correlation anymore, but a relative 
determination. The gist of this idea is that even if the object does not exist, an actual presentation of the 
object is actually conditioned by it: even if Socrates does not exist anymore, your presentation of 
Socrates is a presentation of Socrates and of nothing else. Consequently: just as a relation exists if it can 
be correctly accepted (remember: ‘to exist’ means ‘to be accepted in a possible true judgment’), a 
relative determination exists if it can be correctly accepted; but the correlation between you presenting 
Socrates and Socrates (when Socrates exists), and the relative determination of you presenting Socrates 
to Socrates (when he does not exist) can be correctly accepted; therefore, in both situations, the 
intentional predicate (correlation / relative determination) exists over and above the thinking subject 
(i.e., you) and the object. Schematically – N.B.: whatever is drawn in the following schematas exists; 
continuous lines represent real, discontinuous lines, non-real entities (P = the presenting of; C = 
correlation; O = objects; Y = you; RD = relative determination)125: 
                
Figure 4 
In what sense exactly does a thinking subject become similar to its object? In other words: how are 
we to understand ‘assimilation’ in ‘MA’ (or ‘similitude’ in ‘mental similitude’)? The reason why Marty 
chooses to call the intentional relation a relation of similitude or assimilation is that both relations, i.e. 
standard similitude and MA, are grounded relations: The thinking subject’s relation to Socrates in case 1 
or 2 (it does not matter which) is analogue to the relation holding between a red thing  and any other red 
thing with respect to colour; furthermore,  standard similitude as well comes in two kinds, namely as a 
correlation and as a relative determination, a typical example of the latter being the one of a (good) 
picture of a dead person and its manifest similitude to an entity which does not exist anymore126. But 
                                                                                                                                                                         
a corresponding correlation would exist. That something which is merely possible truly exists is not a problem within 
Marty’s philosophy: if the possible at stake is a genuine one (i.e. if it can be accepted in a true judgment), then it exists – see 
A. MARTY, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie, § 66, p. 317: “Dementsprechend 
zerfällt uns das Gebiet des Existierenden oder mit Wahrheit Anerkenntlichen in zwei Bezirke, dasjenige was existiert und real 
ist und dasjenige was existiert ohne real zu sein. […] Namen wie: ein Mangel, eine Möglichkeit usw., auch wenn das Genannte 
in aller Wahrheit anzuerkennen ist, <bezeichnen> doch nichts Reales […].” 
125 Just as the talk of relations existing “between” their terms is a mere façon de parler, so are the graphical representation 
of relations in our schemes. The lines drawn represent the relational character of the mental acts involved, and not the 
existence of a “bridge” between the subject and its actual or possible object. 
126 See A. MARTY, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie, § 97, p. 408. 
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here stops the list of the features common to both types of similitude. As a matter of fact, MA is a 
relation sui generis: 
And thus, <mental similitude> obviously differs from the usually so-called 
concordance in such essential features […] that one inevitably must refer to it as a 
relation sui generis which is adequately named thus only in virtue of a certain 
analogy.127 
Four differences with respect to standard similitude are identified 128 . (i) MA is a positive 
determination, whereas standard similitude is a negative one129. (ii) Unlike standard similitude, MA does 
not come in degrees – that is to say: MA displays something vaguely analogue to degrees in the sense that 
there is a qualitative jump in similarity between a perceptual and a conceptual presentation (i.e. between 
an Anschauung and a Begriff): since there are no universal entities to which a presentation could be 
mentally similar (Marty is a militant nominalist with respect to universals), MA in the case of a 
conceptual presentation necessarily is of a lesser “degree” than in the case of a perceptual presentation. 
(iii) MA does not belong to one of the two possible types of standard similitude, namely mereological 
similitude (two complexes have some equal parts) and logical similitude (two close species within the 
same genus): your presentation of Socrates and Socrates are complexes, but they do not have any equal 
parts (compare: two organisms and their organs, for example); your presentation of Socrates and 
Socrates are both real entities, but it is clearly not sufficient for two entities to be real in order to be 
significantly called similar. (iv) The way in which MA is grounded fundamentally differs from the way in 
which standard similitude is: in the case of the latter, the bearer and the fundament of the relation (e.g. a 
house and its colour) “stand on an equal foot” (sind ebenbürtig), something which does not hold in the case 
of the former. Take the relation of standard similitude holding between two yellow houses A and B. 
There is a perfect symmetry here: no term of this relation is in a “dominant” position (A is similar to B in 
exactly the same sense as B is to A). Compare with the MA holding between your presentation of 
Socrates and Socrates: here, there is a clear asymmetry, for the very nature of MA entails that your 
presentation of Socrates is in a dominant position with respect to Socrates (your presentation of Socrates 
is a mental similitude, whereas the similitude between A and B is not an “A-similitude” or a “B-similitude”, 
but a similitude tout court)130. 
                                                      
127 A. MARTY, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie, § 96, p. 408: “Und so ist 
<die ideelle Ähnlichkeit> denn offenkundig durch so wesentliche Züge von der gewöhnlich sog. Übereinstimmung 
verschieden […], dass man sie unweigerlich als ein Verhältnis sui generis bezeichnen muss, welches nur um einer gewissen 
Analogie willen […] passend so genannt wird.” Marty also talks of MA as being a relation of similitude in a modified sense (for 
example ibid., § 95, p. 407). 
128 The first three differences are exposed and discussed in A. MARTY, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen 
Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie, § 96, pp. 407-408; the fourth one, in § 98, pp. 413-415.  
129 In 1901, Marty presented a short paper entitled “Über die Ähnlichkeit” to the 4th International Congress of Philosophy 
in Paris. Only standard similitude is discussed and MA not even mentioned. Marty gives the following definition of standard 
similitude: “‘Ähnlich’ ist das voneinander Verschiedene, wenn dessen Verschiedenheit nicht so gross ist, dass es gar nicht 
mehr aneinander zu erinnern vermag.” – A. MARTY, Über die Ähnlichkeit, in J. EISEMEIER, A. KASTIL, O. KRAUS (Hrsg.), Anton 
Marty. Gesammelte Schriften, II.2, Max Niemeyer, Halle a. S., 1920, pp. 107-111 (p. 110). The negative character of standard 
similitude thus lies in the fact that the notion results from a twofold negative delimitation: A is similar to B if A is not 
identical to B, and if A is not so different from B that it is unable to remind of it.  
130 Thus ‘ideell’ in ‘ideelle Verähnlichung’ does not mean ‘ideal’ in a Platonic sense, nor does it mean ‘aspiring’ or ‘hopeful’, 
as suggested by B. Smith, but only ‘mental’ in the sense that MA holds only with respect to at least one mental term. This 
correction has already been made by R. Rollinger – see A. MARTY, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik 
und Sprachphilosophie, § 95, pp. 406-407; B. SMITH, Austrian Philosophy, p. 112 and R. ROLLINGER, Husserl’s Position in the 
School of Brentano, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1999, p. 217. 
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Coming back on all the relevant features of intentionality conceived as MA – its character of grounded, 
sui generis relation, its non-reality and thus, its dependence on a real mental process, and finally, its 
merely relational and non-correlational nature –, Marty summarizes his new (and definitive) theory of 
intentionality as follows: 
What is important for us is that all what we just said about grounded or conditioned relations 
and the most obvious examples thereof (such as the usually so-called equality, difference and 
similitude) holds for this peculiar relation as well, which we presented as being remotely akin 
to the ones mentioned above and whom, in virtue of this affinity, we also called similitude or 
correspondence, although with the modifying clause: ideal or mental. Insofar as a relation […] 
is at play in our states of consciousness, for example in presenting, we undoubtedly have to do 
with a conditioned or grounded <relation>. It is grounded first of all in a certain real process 
in the soul, which is different when I present red or blue, or <when I present> a sound. It 
follows from this change in the soul that, as a non-real consequence, the presenting <subject> 
becomes actually or possibly conform with the so-called object in a peculiar way, for example 
with the red or blue, with a colour or a sound; actually conform when the red or blue exists, 
merely possibly or hypothetically in case it does not exist. In that sense, one may refer to the 
presenting as a possible or actual mental assimilation or adequation to something which we 
call its object. If the object exists, this similitude subsists in the sense of an actual correlation; 
if it does not exist, it subsists merely in the sense of a relative determination. <And> one of 
the reasons for the fiction of the immanent object was that […] one believed that in such a 
case a<n actual> correlation was given as well.131 
The last sentence of this long quotation also recalls how the theory of MA is to be situated within a 
broader systematic context. With the discovery that intentionality is not essentially correlational – more 
precisely: that it is not necessarily correlational with respect to the objects of psychic phenomena – one 
eliminates one of the main reasons to accept problematic immanent objects, and one can maintain the 
relational character of intentionality, that is: secure the objectivity of knowledge. Such a theory can be 
legitimately labelled as a philosophical tour de force, for it succeeds in accounting for the truth of the 
sentence ‘every presentation has an object’ (or ‘every presentation is a presentation of an object’) 
without having to assume one of the two problematic alternatives to “immanentism”, namely Platonism 
and Meinongianism132. 
                                                      
131 A. MARTY, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie, § 97, pp. 412-413: “Worauf 
es uns hier ankommt, ist nun aber, dass all das, was wir eben von den begründeten oder bedingten Relationen und den 
offenkundigsten Beispielen für sie (wie der gewöhnlich so genannten Gleichheit, Verschiedenheit und Ähnlichkeit) sagten, 
auch von jener eigentümlichen Relation gilt, die wir den oben erwähnten als entfernt verwandt bezeichneten und um dieser 
Verwandtschaft willen gleichfalls Ähnlichkeit oder Übereinstimmung nannten, wenn auch mit dem modifizierenden Beisatz: 
ideell oder mental. Soweit bei unseren Bewusstseinszuständen z.B. beim Vorstellen […] eine Relation im Spiele ist, ist es 
zweifellos eine bedingte oder begründete. Sie ist vor allem begründet in einem gewissen realen Vorgang in der Seele, der ein 
anderer ist, wenn ich Rot, ein anderer, wenn ich Blau oder einen Ton vorstelle. An diese seelische Veränderung knüpft sich 
[…] als nichtreale Folge, dass der Vorstellende, sei es wirklich, sei es möglicherweise, in eigentümlicher Weise konform 
oder ähnlich wird dem sog. Objekt, z.B. dem Rot oder Blau, einer Farbe oder einem Ton; wirklich konform, wenn Rot oder 
Blau usw. existiert, bloß möglicherweise oder hypothetisch, falls es nicht existiert. In diesem Sinne kann man das Vorstellen 
eine mögliche oder wirkliche ideelle Verähnlichung oder Adäquation an etwas bezeichnen, was wir dessen Objekt nennen. 
Existiert das Objekt, so  besteht jene Ähnlichkeit im Sinne einer wirklichen Korrelation; existiert es nicht, so besteht sie bloß 
im Sinne einer relativen Bestimmung. Dass man auch hier eine Korrelation gegeben glaubte, war […] mit ein Anlass zur 
Fiktion des sog. immanenten Gegenstands.” 
132 Indeed, once one rejects immanent objects, possible ways out, if one sticks to the correlational nature of intentionality, 
consist in i) embracing an ontology à la Meinong (there are non-existing entities), or ii) accepting an ontology à la Bolzano-
Frege-Husserl (there are ideal, abstract entities) – two positions which are incompatible with Marty’s ontology (there isn’t 
anything which does not exist) and with his nominalism (abstract, ideal entities are mere fictions). For critical stance towards 
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2.2. The emergence of intentionality as MA along Marty’s philosophical way (1894-1906) 
As we have seen at the beginning of the previous section, Marty seems not to have come to the idea 
of intentionality as MA before March 1906. This does not mean, however, that one cannot find 
systematic elements in Marty’s earlier works which prefigure the later theory, and thereby contribute to 
a better understanding of it. In this section, we shall attempt to identify some relevant hints within the 
philosophical development which took place from the time of the Deskriptive Psychologie onward to 
(roughly) the Untersuchungen. We shall begin by reconstructing a general (and brute) chronology of facts 
(section 1); we shall then give some systematic details regarding the main stages of such a development 
(sections 2 to 4); finally (section 5), we shall suggest an explanation for what we believe happened 
between the late eighties and 1906.  
2.2.1. Chronological elements 
Before coming to the conclusion (reached probably as early as 1905 but certainly after March 1906) 
that immanent objects are linguistic fictions, Marty started to work on his theory of relations in general, 
and of psychic relations in particular133. This took place during the time he lectured on descriptive 
psychology, and thus between 1889 and 1894. In the Deskriptive Psychologie, Marty wrestles (among other 
things) with the notion of “quasi-equality” (Quasigleichheit) in the field of psychic relations. On 
November 24th 1893, Brentano writes to Marty that he intends to get rid of non-real entities134. By June 
7th 1901, Marty had read both volumes of Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen and the two philosophers 
entertain an epistolary exchange pertaining mainly to the question of the existence of immanent objects, 
still accepted by Marty, and strongly rejected by Husserl. In a draft of a (lost) letter that was sent to 
Marty after July 7th 1901 (and which was read by Marty before August 17th 1901), a draft which is 
thematically and systematically very close to his 1894 tract entitled Intentionale Gegenstände (published 
only in 1979), Husserl introduces the idea of the intentional relation as being a merely hypothetical 
relation. On January 7th 1903, Brentano still hesitates to reject all non-real entities135 – an hesitation 
which will have disappeard in September of the same year136. In a dictation of May 13th 1904, Brentano 
says that the subject’s being directed towards an object (or content) is not to be undertsood in terms of a 
subject-object correlation, but that when both subject and object exist, there is a kind of modified 
relation of similitude holding between the subject and its object; furthermore, what Brentano calls das 
Gedachte als Gedachtes (and what Marty would call an immanent object) has to be dismissed as a mere 
fiction137. A letter of Marty from September 18th 1904 shows that he has obviously integrated Husserl’s 
idea of merely hypothetical psychic relations, but that he still holds on to the existence of immanent 
                                                                                                                                                                         
Bolzano’s, Husserl’s and Meinong’s ontologies, see for example A. MARTY, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen 
Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie, § 67, p. 322. 
133 It is worth noticing that Brentano’s Psyhcologie of 1874 does not address the topic of psychic relations as such. In his 
Deskriptive Psychologie of 1889, by contrast, the topic is dealt with in the section of part I.2 entitled “Parts of the intentional 
pair of correlates”. This section contains materials to which Marty’s treatment of psychic relations in his own Deskriptive 
Psychologie of 1893/1894 are clearly related, although Brentano remains extremely brief and concise, while Marty gives a 
more explicit account of those relations. As for the appendix dated from September 1901 and entitled “Über die Relationen der 
Seele”, its content is quite different. There, Brentano is mainly interested in establishing a typology of relations according to 
their objects and to their ways of being related to them, as well as in describing the many differences existing among relations 
of judgment and among emotional relations.    
134 See above, n. 94. 
135 F. BRENTANO, letter to Marty of January 7th 1903, in ID., Die Abkehr vom Nichtrealen, pp. 106-108. 
136 F. BRENTANO, letter to Marty of September 10th 1903, in ID., Die Abkehr vom Nichtrealen, pp. 108-109. 
137 F. BRENTANO, “Vom ens rationis”, in ID., Die Abkehr vom Nichtrealen, p. 324 (text quoted below, note 171). 
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objects. In his reply to this letter, Brentano insists that all relations are fictions138. In his 1905 long 
review of Meinong’s first edition of Über Annahmen (1902), Marty seems to have rejected the idea of 
immanent objects. Sometimes between 1904 and 1906, Marty adopts the theory of relations according 
to which relations are primarily divided in grounded and grounding relations. On March 2nd 1906, 
Marty formulates his new theory of intentionality as mental assimilation (MA). In a text dated from 
1907/1908, Brentano says that the psychic relation (psychische Beziehung) is not a relation proper, but 
only something similar to a relation139. In 1908, Marty presents his Untersuchungen to Brentano at the 
occasion of his 70th birthday. In March 1910, Brentano writes a sketch of what will become the appendix 
of his 1911 Zur Klassifikation der psychischen Phänomene and sends this draft to Marty: the first point in the 
sketch reads “psychische Beziehung und eigentliche Relation”. In 1911, Brentano publishes his Zur 
Klassifikation and presents the intentional relation as something merely relation-like (etwas Relativliches). 
2.2.2. The relation of quasi-equality (1893-1894)   
With respect to Marty’s final theory of intentionality as a relation of MA, two remarkable 
anticipations are present in the Deskriptive Psychologie of 1893/1894. First, the description of a certain 
kind of modified relation of equality (quasi-equality) holding between the immanent and transcendent 
objects; second, the idea that a relation which is to some extent analogue to quasi-equality holds 
between a true judgment and its immanent object. The anticipating character of the Deskriptive Psychologie 
consists in the fact that from 1906 onward, the relation of MA (i.e. the intentional relation) will partly 
display features, and assume roles, which, for the early Marty, were clearly identified, but not yet 
identified as being the roles and features of the intentional relation. 
In the paragraphs of section 2 of the Deskriptive Psychologie dealing with relations as they are given in 
acts of presenting140, Marty discusses separately “synechological” relations (holding between a continuum 
and its parts), relations of equality and difference, and relations of similitude, identity and opposition. At 
this occasion, he introduces the notion of quasi-equality as the relation holding between the thing X and 
the presented thing *X: 
Besides the true equality, one has to pay attention to what one may call quasi-equality. 
Such <a quasi-equality> subsists e.g. between a real and a “presented Taler”, a real 
and a “past king”. It is clear that a “past king” is not a king, a presented Taler, not a 
Taler. How is it, then, that one nonetheless calls this a “Taler” and a “King”? There 
subsists not equality, but quasi-equality, something totally peculiar, which cannot be 
described. Everyone must experience it in himself, and notice it. This is something to 
which attention has not always been paid.141 
                                                      
138 F. BRENTANO, reply to Marty’s letter of September 18th 1904, in in ID., Die Abkehr vom Nichtrealen, pp. 114-115.  
139 F. BRENTANO, Die Abkehr vom Nichtrealen, p. 371-372. 
140 A. MARTY, Deskriptive Psychologie, II, §§ 18-22. Part 2 of the work is devoted to the descriptive properties of the acts of 
presenting (Von den deskriptiven Eigentümlichkeiten des Vorstellungslebens). The relations at stake are relations which can be 
presented, and not the intentional relation itself, which is constitutive of mental acts. The intentional relation is discussed in 
part 5 of the work (Von den Relationen auf psychischem Gebiete). 
141 A. MARTY, Deskriptive Psychologie, II.1, § 20, p. 110: “Zu beachten ist neben der wahren Gleichheit etwas, was man 
Quasigleichheit nennen kann. Eine solche besteht z.B. zwischen einem wirklichen und einem vorgestellten Taler, einem 
wirklichen und einem ‘gewesenen Könige’. Es ist ja klar, ein ‘gewesener König’ ist kein König, ein vorgestellter Taler kein 
Taler. Wie kommt es nun, dass man das doch einen ‘Taler’ und einen ‘König’ nennt? Es besteht nicht Gleichheit, aber 
Quasigleichheit, etwas ganz Eigentümliches, was sich nicht beschreiben lässt. Es muss jeder in sich erfahren und dann merken. 
Dies ist nicht immer beachtet worden.” 
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Here, we have the idea of a modified relation of equality, something which somehow (anticipatively) 
reminds of the notion of a modified relation of similitude which Marty will use from 1906 onward to 
characterize the MA; also, the modified equality of 1893/1894 holds between something mental (*X) 
and something extra-mental (X), just as the MA of 1906 and later will hold between a thinking subject 
and its object. However, the modified relation of equality described by Marty in this section of the 
Deskriptive Psychologie is not the intentional relation, but only a kind of relation which is given in our acts 
of presenting (one of the “presentable” relations). Similitude (Ähnlichkeit), for its part, as discussed in 
1893/1894, does not come in a modified kind, neither does it hold between something mental and 
something extra-mental. There is only standard similitude and it only holds between extra-mental 
entities142. 
2.2.3. The intentional relation and the relation of truth (1893/1894) 
In the Deskriptive Psychologie, Marty distinguishes relations which hold i) between extra-mental 
entities only (similitude), ii) between either mental or extra-mental entities (equality, difference, 
opposition), iii) between mental entities only (the intentional relation, the relation of truth and 
goodness), and iv) between a mental and an extra-mental entity (quasi-equality)143. In accordance with 
Marty’s acceptance of immanent objects at that time, the intentional relation is described as follows: 
The intentional relation is totally alien to the physical realm and exclusively 
characteristical for the psychic <realm; it is> the respect of the consciousness to the 
immanent object.144  
This intentional relation has the peculiarity to be a real relation of whose terms only 
one is real and the other non-real. For the first term, we do not have another name 
than precisely judging, loving, hating or, most generally speaking, consciousness, self, 
I. The other term is the object, what is accepted, loved, etc. This second term is non-
real, for thereby the real object is not meant, but merely the intentional <object> 
which inhabitates me, and that, <namely> what is presented, loved, judged as such is 
non-real.145  
This identification of the object (i.e. what is presented, etc.) with the immanent object seems to 
conflict with a passage from Marty’s 5th article Über subjectlose Sätze (1894). There, curiously anticipating 
the famous letter Brentano (!) will address to him on March 17th 1905, Marty writes the following: 
                                                      
142 Marty distinguishes three types of similitude. A and B are similar if: i) they display minimal specific differences (as do 
two nuances of the same colour); ii) they are unequal but display equal relations (this is the case of analogy: the relation a/b is 
equal to the relation c/d); iii) they are complexes comprising equal and non-equal parts.      
143 The criteria for this typology are not all explicitly spelled out in one place in the Deskriptive Psychologie. However, the 
(repeated, and partly overlapping) treatment of relations in this work (II, §§ 18-22 and V), as well as what Marty says when 
introducing and characterizing the different types of relations clearly shows that such criteria are at work. A key passage in 
that respect is the beginning of part V, Von den Relationen auf psychischem Gebiete.    
144 A. MARTY, Deskriptive Psychologie, V, § 3, p. 165: “Dem physischen Gebiete ganz fremd und nur für das psychische 
charakteristisch ist die intentionale Relation, die Beziehung des Bewusstseins zum immanenten Objekte.” 
145 A. MARTY, Deskriptive Psychologie, V, § 3, p. 166: “Diese intentionale Relation hat das Eigene, dass sie eine reale 
Relation ist, wovon aber nur ein Terminus real ist, der andere nicht real. Für den einen Terminus haben wir keinen anderen 
Namen als eben Urteilen, Lieben und Hassen oder, im allgemeinsten Ausdruck, Bewusstsein, Selbst, Ich. Der andere 
Terminus ist das Objekt, das Anerkannte, das Geliebte usw. Dieser zweite Terminus ist nun nicht real, denn es ist damit 
nicht das wirkliche Objekt gemeint, sondern eben nur das intentionale, das mir innewohnende, und dieses, das Vorgestellte, 
das Geliebte, das Beurteilte als solches ist eben nicht real.”  
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The immanent object exists whenever the relevant act of consciousness really exists. 
For there is no consciousness without an object immanent to it; the one is a correlate 
of the other. The object tout court [der Gegenstand schlechtweg], by contrast, e.g. what is 
presented tout court [das Vorgestellte schlechtweg] can exist or not exist. Is my 
presentation, say, the concept “horse”, so the object exists. Is it a presentation of a 
centaur, so what is presented does not exist; although in this case, of course, it has to 
be acknowledged as presented – otherwise, we precisely would not have “the 
presentation of a centaur”, by which nothing is meant but that the centaur exists in us 
as presented. […] When I say: a horse, a circle exists; what is acknowledged is not a 
presented horse, but a horse – not the object presented as such <i.e. as presented>, 
but the object tout court.146 
The apparent conflict disappears as soon as one takes into account the fact that around 1894, Marty 
distinguishes between two senses of the expression ‘what is presented’ (das Vorgestellte) and the like: 
what is presented as presented (das Vorgestellte als Vorgestelltes, our *X) is the immanent object, whereas 
what is presented tout court (das Vorgestellte schlechtweg) is a transcendent object (our X). In other words: 
when, in the Deskriptive Psychologie, Marty says that what is presented is the immanent object, it means 
that what is presented als Vorgestelltes is the immanent object; when, in his article of 1894, he insists that 
what is presented is not the immanent object, it means that what is presented schlechtweg is a transcendent 
object.147 Accordingly, although it is indeed true that i) the Marty of 1894 identifies the intentional 
correlate with the intentional object, and ii) that the immanent object is taken ontologically seriously as 
being an existing, non-real entity, it does not follow that Marty makes of the immanent object the target 
object of presentations: the immanent object, the Gegenstand als Vorgestelltes, is sharply distinguished from 
the target object, the Gegenstand schlechtweg. 
What about the relation of truth as the (only) second type of relation holding exclusively between 
mental entities according to the Deskriptive Psychologie148? Regarding truth and its classical definition as 
adaequatio rei et intellectus, Marty observes that this definition has been misunderstood because some 
philosophers did not realize that what was meant by the definition is an adequation as a relation of quasi-
equality holding between an immanent and a transcendent object149. However, Marty advocates another 
interpretation of it: “[…] the adaequatio rei et intellectus is not to be understood as a quasi-equality”150.  
                                                      
146 A. Marty, Über subjectlose Sätze und das Verhältnis der Grammatik zu Logik und Psychologie, in J. EISEMEIER, A. KASTIL, 
O. KRAUS (Hrsg.), Anton Marty. Gesammelte Schriften, II.1, Max Niemeyer, Halle a. S., 1918, pp. 146-189 (pp. 165-166): 
“Der immanente Gegenstand existiert, so oft der betreffende Bewusstseinsakt wirklich ist. Denn es gibt kein Bewusstsein 
ohne ein ihm immanentes Objekt; das eine ist ein Korrelat des anderen. Der Gegenstand schlechtweg dagegen, z.B. das 
Vorgestellte schlechtweg kann existieren oder auch nicht existieren. Ist meine Vorstellung z.B. der Begriff Pferd, so existiert 
der Gegenstand. Ist es die Vorstellung eines Zentaurs, so existiert das Vorgestellte nicht; obwohl es als Vorgestelltes 
natürlich auch in diesem Falle anzuerkennen ist – hätten wir ja sonst eben nicht ‘die Vorstellung des Zentaurs’, womit doch 
nichts anderes gemeint ist, als dass der Zentaur als Vorgestelltes in uns sei. […] wenn ich sage: ein Pferd, ein Kreis ist. Es ist 
nicht ein vorgestelltes Pferd, sondern ein Pferd anerkannt – nicht der vorgestellte Gegenstand als solcher, sondern der 
Gegenstand schlechtweg.” 
147 Along the same lines, see as well A. Marty, “Anzeige von William James’ Werk The Principles of Psychology” [1894], in 
J. EISEMEIER, A. KASTIL, O. KRAUS (Hrsg.), Anton Marty. Gesammelte Schriften, I.1, Max Niemeyer, Halle a. S., 1916, pp. 105-
156 (p. 145): “Das intentionale Sein des Vorgestellten ist eben sein Vorgestelltwerden, und dies ist das Korrelat des Vorstellens.”   
148 The relation of truth (and the same holds for the relation of goodness) differs from the intentional relation in that 
judging is a polar phenomenon (there is nothing analogue, on the level of  presentations, to the accepting/rejecting polarity 
proper to judgments, or to the loving/hating polarity proper to emotions). With respect to the nature of their terms, 
however, the intentional relation and the relation of truth do not differ: in both cases, the terms are a real mental act and a 
non-real (immanent) object. 
149 A. MARTY, Deskriptive Psychologie, V, § 3, pp. 166-167: “Diese Definition [i.e. veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus] ist 
von manchen gänzlich missverstanden worden, da sie nicht bemerkten, dass damit nur eine Quasigleichheit zwischen dem 
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The reason for such a reading (and subsequent reinterpretation) of the classical definition of truth has 
to do with the different conceptions of judgment defended which are at play here. Traditionally, judging 
was conceived of as an act of composing or dividing concepts (this is the propositional theory of 
judgment); by contrast, Marty (like Brentano) claims that judging is a non-propositional act consisting in 
accepting or rejecting a presented object151. Now, if one conceives of judgments as compositions or 
divisions, one can understand why a relation of adequation or quasi-equality was thought to hold 
between the immanent object of judgment and its transcendent object. Suppose that Socrates is white. A 
classical and standard metaphysical analysis of this fact would say that whiteness inheres in Socrates, and 
thus, that Socrates and his whiteness are two parts of the same complex; as a consequence, when, in an 
act of judging, the subject “Socrates” is composed with the predicate “white”, the resulting, complex 
immanent object and Socrates are quasi-equal with respect to their composition. However, such a view 
cannot satisfactorily account for the truth of negative judgments:  
Above all, one cannot say in the case of a negative judgment that its truth consists in a 
quasi-equality of the intentional with the real object. On the contrary, what one 
should rather say is that those judgments are true in which what is thought does not 
correspond to the real object. The old conception is obviously linked with the 
opinion that judging is a composition or division of presentations (Aristotle) and that it 
is true when it composes what is composed in reality, etc. But such is not the case. A 
judgment is not a composing or dividing, but an accepting or negating [i.e. rejecting], 
which is something totally different.152 
Moreover, the failure of the “old conception” is general since it is unable to account for the truth of a 
large class of affirmative judgments: 
However, the old conception is problematic in the case of affirmative judgments as 
well. Can one say that what is accepted as such is always equal to what is real? At 
most, this can hold in cases where we have a proper presentation of something.153 
The cases of true negative judgments and of true affirmative judgments based on improper 
presentations show that truth cannot be accounted for in terms of a relation of quasi-equality holding 
between an immanent and a transcendent object. Thus, the old conception is guilty of abusive 
generalization. Nonetheless, one is in search of something like an adaequatio rei et intellectus:  
                                                                                                                                                                         
intentionalen und dem wirklichen Objekt gemeint ist. Es fragt sich aber, ob tatsächlich auch nur diese Quasigleichheit 
gegeben sei, denn mancher würde gewiss dagegen protestieren.” 
150 Anton Marty, Deskriptive Psychologie, V, § 4, p. 169. 
151 See for example A. MARTY, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie, §§ 45-47, 
pp. 229-232. Marty always defended the non-propositional (or “idiopathic”) theory of judgment.  
152 A. MARTY, Deskriptive Psychologie, V, § 4, pp. 168: “Vor allem kann man beim verwerfenden Urteile nicht sagen, seine 
Wahrheit bestehe in einer Quasigleichheit des intentionalen und wirklichen Gegenstandes. Da müsste es vielmehr umgekehrt 
heißen, wahr seien diejenigen Urteile, wo das Gedachte dem wirklichen Gegenstande nicht entspricht. Die alte Auffassung 
hänge offenbar mit der Meinung zusammen, dass das Urteilen ein Verbinden oder Trennen von Vorstellungen sei (Aristoteles) 
und dann wahr sei, wenn es verbinde, was in Wirklichkeit verbunden ist usw. Dem ist aber nicht so. Ein Urteil ist kein 
Verbinden oder Trennen, sondern ein Anerkennen oder Leugnen, was total etwas anderes ist.” 
153  A. MARTY, Deskriptive Psychologie, V, § 4, pp. 168-169: “Allein auch beim anerkennenden Urteile ist die alte 
Auffassung bedenklich. Kann man sagen, dass das Anerkannte als solches immer dem Wirklichen gleich sei? Das wird 
höchstens da gelten können, wo wir die eigentliche Vorstellung von etwas haben.” For example, in what sense can one say 
that the immanent object of the true judgment “a molecule of water exists” is quasi-equal to an existing molecule of water?  
34 
 
Thus there must certainly be a sense in which there is an adaequatio rei et intellectus, 
but the question is only in what sense one can talk of such <an adequation>. Is it 
really a quasi-equality of the intentional with the real object, or is it something else? 
At any rate, I believe that one cannot maintain the former.154 
Here is Marty’s answer: 
Truth is not at all correspondence or adaequatio in the sense of any identity, equality 
or similitude, but rather <in the sense> of a fitting and thus adequate behaviour of 
the judging <subject> with respect to what is judged. One may also call this a 
harmony between the judgment and what is judged, and this holds for all 
judgments.155  
In short, then, the relation of truth is an adaequatio rei et intellectus, however: i) not in the sense of an 
identity, equality or similitude; and ii) it does not hold between an immanent and a transcendent object. 
Therefore, truth is not a relation of quasi-equality, but a kind of harmony156, and it holds between the 
act and the immanent object. Schematically, we can summarize the situation as follows (the box 
represents the thinking subject; ‘T’ reads: ‘truth’; ‘ARI’: ‘adaequatio rei et intellectus, ‘IR’: ‘intentional 
relation’, and ‘QE’: ‘quasi-equality’, ‘H’: ‘harmony’; a dotted line represents a relation which can – or 
can not – obtain; the first schema shows how, according to Marty, the classical definition of truth as ARI 





                                                      
154 A. MARTY, Deskriptive Psychologie, V, § 4, pp. 168: “Also in irgendeinem Sinne muss ganz gewiss eine adaequatio rei et 
intellectus gegeben sein, und es fragt sich bloß, in welchem Sinne von einer solchen die Rede sein kann. Ist es wirklich eine 
Quasigleichheit des intentionalen und des wirklichen Objektes oder ist es etwas anderes? Und da glaube ich allerdings, dass 
man das Erstere nicht aufrechterhalten kann.” 
155 Anton Marty, Deskriptive Psychologie, V, § 4, p. 169 : “Die Wahrheit ist überhaupt nicht Übereinstimmung oder 
adaequatio im Sinne irgendeiner Identität, Gleichheit oder Ähnlichkeit, sondern eines passenden und in diesem Sinne 
adäquaten Verhaltens des Urteilenden zum Beurteilten. Das kann man auch eine Harmonie nennen zwischen Urteil und 
Beurteiltem, und das gilt für alle Urteile.” In the Untersuchungen, Marty will distinguish between das Geurteilte and das Beurteilte, 
the former referring to a content of judgment (i.e. the non-real, existent, and transcendent entity “the existence of Socrates” 
for the judgment “Socrates exists”), the latter to its object (here, the real, existent, and transcendent entity Socrates). In the 
Deskriptive Psychologie, however, the immanent object is called das Beurteilte,– see Anton Marty, Deskriptive Psychologie, V, § 3, 
p. 166, text quoted above, n. 145.  
156 Regarding the terminology used by Marty in the Deskritpive Psychologie and the Untersuchungen, one can underscore that 
the terms used in 1893/1894 to characterize the adaequatio of the classical definition of truth (Übereinstimmung, Adäquation, 
Gleichheit, Ähnlichkeit) are precisely the ones he will use in the Untersuchungen when introducing intentionality as a kind of MA. 
The “classical” understanding of truth as ARI 
ACT O Imm.O  T 
QE 
IR 
Marty’s reinterpretation of truth as ARI 
ACT O Imm.O  
QE 




It is not the place to go into the details – and the weaknesses – of such a conception of truth. For our 
purpose, it is sufficient to note that Marty’s reinterpretation of the classical definition of truth dissociates 
the relation of truth from the relation of quasi-equality. Such a dissociation also entails a kind of 
analogical transposition: the place to look in order to understand what truth is has just been “moved to 
the left”. The very powerful, but non-generalizable feature of quasi-equality gets lost on the way and is 
replaced by the intriguing notion of harmony157. In this respect, the later relation of MA appears to have 
inherited a feature analogue to quasi-equality (MA is a modified similitude): just as according to the “old” 
or traditional conception of truth, the immanent object was supposed to be quasi-equal to a transcendent 
object, in Marty’s later conception, the thinking subject will be said to be mentally assimilated (i.e. 
similar in a modified sense) to a transcendent object.  
In dissociating the relations of truth and quasi-equality, the reinterpretation of the classical definition 
of truth in the Deskriptive Psychologie remedies to the shortcomings of the “old conception” (true negative 
judgments, true affirmative judgments based on improper presentations), but it also looses the essential 
“transcending” character of a relation like quasi-equality as it holds between the mental and the extra-
mental – after all, truth, if it is supposed to be an objective notion, simply requires some kind of bridging 
between the mental and the extra-mental. In that sense, the position at which Marty will arrive in 1906, 
not only with respect to truth, but to intentionality in general, represents a synthesis of elements already 
present in 1893/1894. A further element of central importance for the later theory is still missing, 
though. It is the notion of potential relation, a notion which, eventually, will lead Marty to his 
conception of merely possible correlations or relative Bestimmungen. As suggested in the brute chronology 
sketched above, this idea has its origin in Marty’s correspondence with Husserl in the summer of the 
year 1901.    
2.2.4. Hypothetical relations (1901) 
The letters Husserl and Marty exchanged in summer 1901 played a crucial role – one might even 
want to say the key role – in the transition from Marty’s early to his later conception of intentionality. 
The reading of Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen lead Marty to discuss several topics with his colleage of 
Halle158, and among them, the question of the immanent objects. At that time, Marty clearly sticks to 
the thesis that there cannot be a psychic phenomenon without an immanent object: 
[…] there <can> be no meaning [Meinen] […] without an object which is immanent 
to the presentation. […] in authentic presenting there is in my view a consciousness’s 
mode of behaving with respect to something, an ‘intention’ directed to something 
(not of course in the sense of an intention [Absicht] but rather in the sense of another 
peculiar relation) which has the immanent object as its counterpart, as a necessary 
correlate, as the other term of the relation.159 [transl. Mulligan and Schuhmann, 
slightly modified]. 
                                                      
157 A very clear sign of such an analogical transposition is the fact that Marty insists on keeping the denomination of 
‘adaequatio rei et intellectus’ for both the classical account and his own. This anticipates the new formulation found in the 
Untersuchungen: “Veritas est adaequatio cogitantis et cogitati” – A. MARTY, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen 
Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie, § 102, p. 426. 
158 For an edition and translation, as well as an introduction and commentary of those letters, see K. MULLIGAN, 
K. SCHUHMANN, Two Letters from Marty to Husserl, pp. 225-236. 
159 A. Marty, letter to Husserl of June 7th 1901, in K. MULLIGAN, K. SCHUHMANN, Two Letters from Marty to Husserl, p. 227: 
“[…] es <kann> kein ‘Meinen’ geben […] ohne einen einer Vorstellung immanenten Gegenstand. […] Beim eigentlichen 
Vorstellen […] ist m.E. eine Weise des Verhaltens des Bewusstseins zu etwas, eine “Intention” auf etwas (natürlich nicht im 
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Note that the intentional relation is now labelled as a kind of behaving (Verhalten), a term which, in 
1893/1894, was used only with respect to the relation of truth as a kind of harmony160; furthermore, 
this way of psychic behaving is qualified as a peculiar relation (eigentümliche Beziehung). In sharp 
opposition to Marty, Husserl takes immanent objects to be superfluous “psychological hypostatizations”, 
a charge which Marty accepts, thereby confirming that he takes immanent objects ontologically seriously: 
[…] there seems to me to be no alternative to the doctrine of the ‘psychological 
hypostatization’ of what is general. Of course, I would never want to call an 
immanent object ‘real’.161 [transl. Mulligan and Schuhmann] 
Marty’s position is linked to the fact that he is (still) convinced that the intentional relation must be a 
correlation, and nothing else: 
[…] the nature of every relation entails, in my opinion, that if one term of the 
relation exists, the same necessarily holds also of the other term. The intentional 
object must therefore exist as often as the ‘intention’ exists.162 [transl. Mulligan and 
Schuhmann] 
In his reply to Marty’s letter of June 7th 1901, Husserl formulates a thesis which can be found already 
in his long (and only recently published) tract Intentionale Gegenstände of 1894, and which, we believe, 
definitely put Marty on the way to his own solution of the problem of intentionality. The idea is that 
relations can be merely hypothetical, and its key character consists in that it allows to maintain the 
relational nature of intentionality without having to maintain the existence of immanent objects: 
What is presented in a presenting is what a corresponding adequate perception itself 
would put in front of the eyes exactly as it was presented.163 [Italics ours]    
                                                                                                                                                                         
Sinne der Absicht, sondern einer anderen, eigentümlichen Beziehung) gegeben, welcher eben notwendig als Korrelativ, als 
anderes Beziehungsglied, der immanente Gegenstand gegenüber steht.” 
160 On the characterisation of intentionality as a kind of behaviour, see F. BRENTANO, Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis, 
Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, 1955, p. 16 : “Der gemeinsame Charakterzug alles Psychischen besteht in dem, was man 
häufig mit einem leider sehr mißverständlichen Ausdruck Bewußtsein genannt hat, d. h. in einem subjektischen Verhalten, in 
einer, wie man sie bezeichnete, intentionalen Beziehung zu etwas, was vielleicht nicht wirklich, aber doch innerlich 
gegenständlich gegeben ist.” 
161 A. MARTY, letter to Husserl of June 7th 1901, in K. MULLIGAN, K. SCHUHMANN, Two Letters from Marty to Husserl, 
p. 227: “[…] so bleibt – scheint mir – nichts übrig, als doch etwas wie eine ‘psychologische Hypostasierung’ des allgemeinen 
zu lehren. Freilich, ‘real’ möchte ich den immanenten Gegenstand niemals nennen.”  
162 A. MARTY, letter to Husserl of June 7th 1901, in K. MULLIGAN, K. SCHUHMANN, Two Letters from Marty to Husserl, 
p. 227: “[…] die Natur jeder Relation bringt es m.E. mit sich, dass, wenn ein Glied derselben existiert, dies notwendig auch 
vom anderen gilt. Der intentionale Gegenstand muss also existieren, so oft die ‘Intention’ existiert.” According to Husserl, 
by contrast, there isn’t any necessary connection between the existence of, say, a presentation and its object, neither 
immanent, nor transcendent: “Zwischen intentionalem und wirklichem bzw. unwirklichem Gegenstand besteht kein 
Unterschied, die öftere Rede von bloß intentionalen Gegenständen oder gar von bloß intentionaler Existenz besagt nicht die 
Existenz von Gegenständen als der Intention in irgendeinem eigentlichen Sinne einwohnenden, sondern die bloße Existenz der 
betreffenden Vorstellungen und die Nichtexistenz ihrer Gegenstände. Die Vorstellung hat nicht bloß ein intentionales, sondern auch 
ein wirkliches Objekt, heißt: Sie stellt ein Objekt nicht bloß vor, sondern das Objekt ist auch. Vorstellen = das einen 
Gegenstand in vorstellender Weise Meinen existiert, aber der Gegenstand selbst existiert nicht, weder im Vorstellen noch 
außerhalb.” (E. HUSSERL, draft of a letter to Marty of July 7th 1910, hg. v. B. RANG, in E. HUSSERL, Aufsätze und Rezensionen 
1890-1910, Martinus Nijhof Publishers, The Hague, 1979 [Husserliana XXII], pp. 419-426, here p. 421). The locus classicus 
for Husserl’s arguments against immanent objects are the §§ 11 and 21 of the 5th Investigation. 
163 E. HUSSERL, draft of a letter to Marty of July 7th 1910, p. 422: “Vorgestellt in einer Vorstellung ist dasjenige, was eine 
entsprechende adäquate Wahrnehmung selbst und genauso, wie es vorgestellt war, vor Augen stellen würde.”   
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This is a quite laconic formulation, and it may seem too weak to support the claim that Marty found 
in Husserl the idea of hypothetical relations. If one turns to the text which constitutes the background of 
Husserl’s reply to Marty, however, one finds a very clear and detailed account of the idea164:    
Accordingly, the talk of any presentation having a comprehension [Umfang], of any 
presentation presenting an object, should be interpreted as a merely improper one. 
Its proper meaning would be expressed, or indirectly indicated, in the <following>: 
provided that the affirmative judgment concerning it would hold, every presenting 
would have a comprehension, <would> present one or several objects. The aim and 
foothold of such an improper <character> could only lie in its practical utility, 
namely: in that every presentation can enter hypothetical relations of the forms 
described; that one can operate with the comprehensions considered under the 
assumption of such existential judgments in a wide, as well as in a strictly limited 
domain, exactly as <one would operate> with real comprehensions; <and> 
moreover, that the equivalence has exactly the formal features of a relation of 
equality, the subordination the formal features of a relation of inclusion, etc., to the 
effect that, insofar as one does not step out of the domain of hypothetical contexts, all 
judging about existence or non-existence of the objects and comprehensions at stake 
can be left aside, <and that> one may deal with the talk of comprehensions and 
relations holding among comprehensions exactly as if it were a proper and absolute 
way of talking.165 [Italics ours] 
A shorter, synthetic formulation reads: 
                                                      
164 Marty probably never read this text which remained unpublished until 1979. Be that as it may, the letter of Husserl he 
did read undoubtedly expresses the idea (even if elliptically). Husserl had sent his tract on intentional objects to Meinong in 
1902, after having read the latter’s first edition of Über Annahmen (the idea of an assumptive way of considering the intentional 
relation, central for Meinong, is indeed already present in Husserl’s tract of 1894, where one even finds the technical 
expression ‘Assumption’) – see A. MEINONG, Über Annahmen, second edition of 1910, § 38: “Alles Meinen ist Annehmen”). All 
this points towards Twardowski as a common source of (positive and negative) inspiration for both Meinong and Husserl. On 
Husserl’s tract Intentionale Gegenstände, see K. SCHUHMANN, Husserls Abhandlung ‘Intentionale Gegenstände’. Edition der 
ursprünglichen Druckfassung, “Brentano Studien” 3 (1991), pp. 137-176; see as well J. ENGLISH’s introduction to E. HUSSERL, 
K. TWARDOWSKI, Sur les objets inentionnels, Présentation, traductions, notes, remarques et index par J. English, Paris: Vrin, 
1993, pp. 9-84; J. BENOIST, Représentations sans objets. Aux origins de la phénoménologie et de la philosophie analytique. Paris: 
Presses Universitaires de France, 2001, pp. 173-216; J.-F. COURTINE, La cause de la phénoménologie, Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 2007, pp. 37-74. 
165 E. HUSSERL, Intentionale Gegenstände, K. SCHUMANN, in Husserls Abhandlung ‘Intentionale Gegenstände’, p. 154-155: “Die 
Rede, dass jede Vorstellung einen Umfang hat, dass eine jede Gegenstände vorstellt, wäre demgemäß als eine bloß 
uneigentliche zu interpretieren. Ihre eigentliche Meinung wäre in dem Satze ausgedrückt bzw. indirekt angedeutet: Jede 
Vorstellung würde, gesetzt, dass für sie das zugehörige affirmative Existentialurteil gälte, einen Umfang haben, einen oder 
mehrere Gegenstände vorstellen. Der Zweck und Halt dieser Uneigentlichkeit könnte nur in ihrer praktischen Nützlichkeit 
liegen, also darin: Dass jede Vorstellung in hypothetische Beziehungen der erörterten Formen eintreten kann; dass man mit den 
unter Assumption solcher Existentialurteile stehenden Umfängen in weitem und fest begrenztem Kreise genauso operieren 
kann wie mit wirklichen Umfängen; des Näheren, dass die Äquivalenz genau die formalen Beschaffenheiten einer 
Gleichheitsbeziehung hat, die Subordination die formalen Beschaffenheiten einer Einschlussbeziehung usw., so dass man, 
wofern nur das Gebiet der hypothetischen Zusammenhänge nicht überschritten, alles Urteilen über Existenz oder Nichtexistenz 
der bezüglichen Gegenstände und Umfänge unterlassen wird, mit der Rede von Umfängen und Umfangsverhältnissen 
genauso umgehen kann, als wäre sie eine eigentliche und absolute.” [Italics ours]. 
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[…] the latter sentence [i.e. ‘every presenting presents an object’] means: every 
presenting can function under an assumption in such a way that <it functions> as if it 
were an absolute presentation with respect to its objectuality.166 [Italics ours] 
In his rather short reply to the extensive letter of Husserl of which only a draft has come down to us, 
Marty reaffirms his conviction that every psychic phenomenon has an immanent object as its correlate. 
This, however, does not mean that the correlate (or immanent object) itself is the target of the 
phenomenon at stake. To Husserl’s objection that accepting an immanent object amounts to make of it 
the target of one’s presentations, Marty replies:  
The object of the presentation of blue is: blue, not: presented blue. But this is quite 
compatible with my view that there corresponds to every presentation a correlate 
which necessarily exists if the presentation exists. For this does not assert that this 
correlate as such (that is, the presented blue) is the object of my presentation. At all 
events this is not the case for a primary act of consciousness. A presented object as such is 
in fact the object of secondary consciousness.167 [Transl. Mulligan and Schuhmann] 
This might explain why Marty does not react to Husserl’s sharp remark according to which accepting 
the existence of immanent objects cannot possibly resolve the difficulty it is supposed to resolve, namely 
to account for the fact that every presentation (even that of a centaur) presents an object. As Husserl 
notes, what is wanted is a theory able to account for this phenomenological fact when there is no object 
at all (not even an immanent one)168. According to the pre-1901 Marty, the immanent object is always 
needed as the correlate of the intentional relation (relations are correlations and there is nothing like 
hypothetical relations yet), but the object tout court (der Gegenstand schlechtweg) does not need to exist169. 
In other words, Marty’s theory of intentionality at this stage of its development does account for the fact 
                                                      
166 E. HUSSERL, Intentionale Gegenstände, § 12, pp. 335-336: “Dagegen besagt der letztere Satz [i.e. ‘jede Vorstellung stellt 
einen Gegenstand vor’]: Jede Vorstellung kann unter einer Assumption so fungieren, als ob sie eine in gegenständlicher Hinsicht 
unbedingt wäre.” [Italics ours]. Another idea of the later Marty which might come from this letter is the one according to which 
the intentional relation is a logical or ideal one (recall that ‘MA’ translates ‘ideelle Verähnlichung): “Dass jede Vorstellung ihrem 
Wesen nach Auffassung ist und als solche aufzufassender Inhalte bedarf, habe ich selbst auszuführen gesucht. Aber die 
Beziehung der Auffassung zum Aufgefassten (repräsentierenden Inhalt) ist eine von Grund aus wesentlich verschiedene von 
der intentionalen Beziehung als Beziehung der ganzen Auffassung (des sinnbelebten Zeichens, des von der Auffassung 
beseelten Inhalts) zum repräsentierten oder intendierten Gegenstand. Die erstere Beziehung ist eine reale, die letztere die ideale 
oder logische. Die Auffassung stellt den aufzufassenden Inhalt nicht vor, sondern indem sie ihn auffasst, stellt sie einen 
(allgemein zu reden) von ihm verschiedenen Inhalt vor.” [Italics ours] – E. HUSSERL, draft of a letter to Marty of July 7th 1910, 
p. 425.  
167 A. MARTY, letter to Husserl of August 17th 1901, in K. MULLIGAN, K. SCHUHMANN, Two Letters from Marty to Husserl, 
p. 235: “[…] Der Gegenstand der Blauvorstellung ist: Blau, nicht: das vorgestellte Blau. Allein dies verträgt sich sehr wohl 
mit meiner These, dass jeder Vorstellung ein Korrelat entspricht, welches notwendig existiert, wenn die Vorstellung 
existiert. Denn damit ist ja nicht behauptet, dass dieses Korrelat als solches (also das vorgestellte Blau) Gegenstand meiner 
Vorstellung sei. Wenigstens gilt dies nicht, wenn es sich um den primären Bewusstseinsakt handelt. Das Vorgestellte als solches 
ist in Wahrheit Gegenstand des sekundären Bewusstseins.” – a similar view was already defended by Marty in 1894, see the 
passage quoted above, n. 146. 
168 E. HUSSERL, draft of a letter to Marty of July 7th 1910, p. 425: “Sollte in jeder Vorstellung sonst dies oder jenes, was 
ich immanentes Objekt nennen will, vorfindlich sein, so wird dadurch jedenfalls nicht die Schwierigkeit, die im scheinbaren 
Widerspruch sub 1) [i.e. the paradox of empty presentations] liegt, behoben. Die Schwierigkeit ist die: Wie kann sich eine 
Vorstellung auf ein Objekt beziehen, während dieses Objekt gar nicht existiert? Und wie kann sich das Bewusstsein auf etwas richten, 
was ihm gar nicht gegenwärtig ist, was ihm gar nicht immanent ist? Ist nun die intentionale Beziehung des Aktes auf das 
Objekt ihrem Sinn nach Beziehung auf das evtl. wirkliche Objekt […] so beweist das zweite Argument zuviel. Es beweist die 
notwendige Existenz des wirklichen Objekts.” [Italics ours] 
169 See A. MARTY, Über subjectlose Sätze, pp. 165-166 (passage quoted above, n. 146).  
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that every presentation presents an object, even when what is presented does not exist at all (the 
intentional correlate is not what is presented).  
2.2.5. Towards the “externalisation” and “ absorption” of immanent objects (1904-1906) 
Marty’s letter to Brentano of September 18th 1904 contains his first reaction to his master’s new 
doctrine. During the summer of the same year, Kraus stayed with Brentano in Schönbühel. On this 
occasion, Kraus wrote down several dictations and brought them to Prag for Marty to read170. Among 
those texts, the short tract entitled “Vom ens rationis” (May 13th, 1904) is of remarkable significance. 
Here, Brentano analyses the phrase ‘to be directed towards something as an object’ in a non-relational 
way; further, he notes that in some accidental situations – namely when both the thinking subject and 
the object happen to exist – the adequate description of the situation does involve a relation, namely a 
kind of relation of modified similitude: 
To say that every thinking subject has an object, a content, does not mean that it is a 
relative in front of which stands a correlative. It [i.e. the thinking subject] is directed 
towards something as its object. If this [i.e. the object] subsists, then a kind of 
relation subsists between the being which is the object and the thinking subject, <a 
relation> which one might call <a relation of> similitude in a peculiarly modified 
sense. By contrast, what is thought as what is thought appears to be a pure fiction 
which must be rejected.171 
This theory of intentionality as a (possible) similitude will not be developped by Brentano 
subsequently, among other reasons because he will abandon the idea of adequation in all its variants.172 
Furthermore, even when Brentano talks of an adequation of the thinking subject with its object, he 
considers it to be a second relation in addition to the psychic relation of presentation, whereas for Marty, 
there is only one relation, which is sometimes actual, and sometimes only potential. 
In a reply of September 18th 1904, Marty appears to be on the verge to find what will be his proper 
solution to the problem of intentionality. In the following passage, Marty maintains that intentional 
(i.e. immanent) objects are indispensable, but only in order to distinguish two qualitatively different acts 
(e.g. accepting and loving) directed upon one and the same object tout court; when the object tout court 
varies, however, the systematic raison d’être of intentional objects disappears: 
I cannot see how the intentional object [i.e. the immanent object]173 could be 
superfluous either. In order to account for the difference between the acceptation of 
A, and that of B, the real object and the relative determination to it are certainly 
sufficient. But when, on the base of inner perception, I try to get a clear picture of 
what the qualitative difference is between the acceptation of A and the love of A, etc., 
I can’t find anything else than that we have to do with a different way of behaving with 
                                                      
170 See note 7 by F. MAYER-HILLEBRAND, in F. BRENTANO, Die Abkehr vom Nichtrealen, p. 406. 
171 F. BRENTANO, “Vom ens rationis”, in ID., Die Abkehr vom Nichtrealen, p. 324: “Damit, dass jedes Denkende einen 
Gegenstand, einen Inhalt hat, ist nicht gesagt, dass es ein Relativ ist, dem ein Korrelativ gegenübersteht. Es ist auf etwas als 
Gegenstand gerichtet. Wenn dies besteht, dann besteht eine Art von Beziehung, die man Ähnlichkeit in besonders 
modifiziertem Sinne nennen mag, zwischen dem Seienden, welches Gegenstand ist, und dem Denkenden. Das Gedachte als 
Gedachtes erscheint dagegen als eine reine Fiktion, die geleugnet werden muss.” 
172 See A. Kastil’s note 1 on p. 167 of Brentano’s Kategorienlehre. 
173 That the early, as well as the late Marty equates the immanent object with the intentional object is clear from the index 
(as well as from many passages) of his Untersuchungen of 1908, where one reads (p. 744): “Intentional: vide immanent”; see as 
well the Deskriptive Psychologie, V, § 3, p. 166 (text quoted above, n. 145).  
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respect to something; in other words: that, as long as it [i.e. the way of behaving] 
exists, it presupposes a correlate, and, as far as its reality is concerned, that it consists 
in a relation. This relation – which is always given – seems to me to be real, and 
different in the case of accepting and in the case of loving, whereas the hypothetical 
relation to the real object seems to me to be non-real, and the same in both cases 
(namely quasi-equality).174  
Intentionality is accounted for by means of two distinct relations differing in their nature and function: 
one relation (R1) holds between the act and the intentional object (it is a correlation, it varies with the 
quality of the act, and is a real relation); another relation (R2) holds between the intentional object and 
the object tout court (it is a relative determination, it does not vary with the quality of the act, it is a non-









Let us come back to the two cases compared by Marty, namely: (1) intentional objects are 
superfluous in order to account for the difference between accepting A and accepting B, but (2) they are 
required in order to account for the qualitative distinction between accepting A and loving A. Two types 
of differences are at stake here: an object-difference (A differs from B), and what one could call a content-
difference: what is correlated to the act of accepting A differs from what is correlated to the act of loving 
A. What is correlated to the act of accepting A and what is correlated to the act of loving A are more than 
merely A: A alone could not possibly account for the difference, for it is strictly identical in both cases. 
Since accepting A and loving A are different relations, they must have different correlates. So, we have to 
do with two different immanent contents. Thus, case (1) provides a reason to believe that immanent 
entities are not required to account for object-differences, while case (2) provides a reason to accept 
immanent entities (as contents), for they alone can account for the difference of, say, accepting A and 
loving A.  
In his reply to Marty’s letter, Brentano says that no relation (that is: no correlation to an immanent 
object or content) is needed to account for the distinction between, say, acts of loving A and of 
accepting A:  
What prevents one from accepting a specific unity for the acts of the A-accepting, A-
rejecting, A-loving, A-hating, <a unity> which belongs, in a different order, to the 
                                                      
174 A. MARTY, letter to Brentano of the 18th September 1904, in F. BRENTANO, Die Abkehr vom Nichtrealen, p. 111-112: 
“Das intentionale Objekt will mir auch nicht entbehrlich erscheinen. Den Unterschied zwischen der Anerkennung von A und 
derjenigen von B zu erklären, genügt freilich das wirkliche Objekt und die relative Bestimmung zu ihm. Aber wenn ich mir 
auf Grund der inneren Erfahrung klarzumachen suche, was der qualitative Unterschied zwischen der Anerkennung von A und 
der Liebe zu A sei usw., so kann ich nichts anderes finden, als dass es eine verschiedene Weise des Verhaltens zu etwas sei. 
M.a.W. dass es, solange es überhaupt ist, ein Korrelat voraussetzt und seiner Realität nach in einer Relation besteht. Diese 
stets gegebene Relation scheint mir real und verschieden beim Anerkennen und beim Lieben, während die hypothetische 
Relation zum wirklichen Objekt mir nichtreal und dieselbe zu sein scheint hier und dort (nämlich Quasigleichheit).” 
The two relations constitutive of intentionality 
(1904) 







acts of an A-accepting, B-accepting, C-accepting or to an A-hating, B-hating and C-
hating and the like, without considering that this unity is given by a relative concept? 
Of course, the A-thinking, B-thinking and C-thinking are specified as such in a way 
analogue to the way A, B, and C are specified. With that, however, no relation is 
given, except when both an A-thinking and A itself or something similar subsists. You 
believe that a relation subsists from the A-thinking to the by-the-A-thinking-thought-
A. But this by-the-A-thinking-thought-A seems to be nothing but a fiction from 
which we can liberate ourselves and maintain, without exception, not only equivalent, 
but fully equivalent, correct thoughts.175 
This suggests that the differentiating roles Marty attributes to contents can be (somehow) re-
distributed on the side of the mental acts themselves and their objects. 
By the way, this letter of Brentano also gives a very clear and concise formulation of how the central 
claim of reism should be understood: 
When I said that one can only think of what is real, this, of course, should not mean 
anything but that we can only think of something which, if it existed, would be 
real.176 
This is in partial accordance with Marty’s conception of the object tout court – what is presented tout 
court (the Gegenstand schlechtweg) can exist (or not exist) without affecting its status of object; but it is also 
opposed to Marty’s view that what is presented tout court by no means has to be a real entity: collectives, 
relations and contents are genuine existing, non-real entities177, and as such, they can perfectly well be 
presented.    
That said, the way leading to the theory which Marty was to adopt from 1906 onward – that is: after 
his fruitful exchanges with Husserl in 1901 and with Brentano in 1904 – can perhaps be described as 
follows. Since i) immanent entities are not required in order to account for object-differences, since 
ii) what is essential for a theory of intentionality is to account for the fact that mental acts have objects, 
and since iii) Brentano and Husserl, in their correspondence with him, forcefully argue that one should 
get rid of immanent entities, Marty is lead to make the crucial theoretical move that will yield his new 
(and final) theory of intentionality: immanent entities eventually get out of the picture and their 
systematic roles are assumed by the remaining elements of the dispositive, namely the act on the one 
                                                      
175 F. BRENTANO, reply to Marty’s letter of September 18th 1904, in ID., Die Abkehr vom Nichtrealen, p. 114-115: “Was 
steht im Wege, für die Akte des A-Anerkennenden, A-Leugenenden, A-Liebenden, A-Hassenden eine spezifische Einheit 
anzunehmen, welche in anderer Serie als die, welche den Akten eines A-Anerkennenden, B-Anerkennenden und C-
Anerkennenden oder des A-Hassenden, B-Hassenden und C-Hassenden u. dgl. zukommt, ohne diese Einheit als durch einen 
relativen Begriff gegeben zu betrachten? Freilich spezifizieren sich das A-Denkende, B-Denkende und C-Denkende als solche 
analog wie A, B und C sich spezifizieren. Allein hiemit ist keine Relation gegeben, ausser wenn sowohl ein A-Denkendes als 
A selbst oder dgl. besteht. Sie glauben, es bestehe eine Relation vom A-Denkenden zu dem von A-Denkenden gedachten A. 
Aber dieses vom A-Denkenden gedachte A scheint nichts als eine Fiktion, von welcher wir uns freimachend, nicht bloss 
äquivalente, sondern die völlig gleichen, richtigen Gedanken ausnahmslos aufrecht erhalten können.”   
176 F. BRENTANO, reply to Marty’s letter of September 18th 1904, in ID., Die Abkehr vom Nichtrealen, p. 114: “Wenn ich 
sagte, man könne nur Reales denken, so sollte dies natürlich nichts anderes heissen, als wir können nur solches denken, was, 
wenn es wäre, etwas Reales wäre.”  
177 A. MARTY, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie, § 66, p. 321: “Was von den 
nichtrealen Relationen, das gilt auch von den weiteren Beispielen des Nichtrealen, auf die man hinzuweisen pflegt: dem 
Mangel, dem bloss Möglichen (d.h. dem, was nicht notwendig nicht ist) und Unmöglichen (d.h. dem notwendig 
Nichtseienden) und überhaupt von den Urteilsinhalten, auch dem Seienden und Notwendigen als solchen und dem Dies- oder 
Jenessein.” [This passage follows immediately the one quoted above, n. 98]. 
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side, and the object tout court on the other. Here takes place what we suggest to call the “absorption” and 
“externalisation” of the immanent object. The side of the object inherits what accounted for content-
differences (recall case 2, above) to the effect that contents are now conceived as non-real, transcendent 
entities given only as consequences (Folgen) of real objects (this is the “externalisation”)178; the act, for its 
part, inherits an analogue of the relation of quasi-equality, a relation of modified similitude (mental 
assimilation, ideelle Verähnlichung) which now holds between the act and the object or what is now 
acknowledged as existing a parte obiecti (this is the “absorbtion”).  Schematically: 
 
 In presenting, accepting, loving A, the thinking subject becomes mentally similar to A itself, the 
existence of A, the value of A respectively. As Marty puts it in 1908: 
Indeed, I believe one can say without hesitation, that it belongs to the essence of any psychic 
activity to be a process which has as a consequence that through it the psychic active subject 
primarily becomes ideally conform to something other than itself.179 
While the act of presenting is essentially an adequation to the differences of the ‘what’ [i.e. the 
quiddity or essence] of an object, the act of judging is a conformity to its being or not being 
[i.e. its existence or non-existence].180 
Finally, the reason for calling the intentional relation a relation of mental assimilation (or ideelle 
Verähnlichung) might be the following: the parallel “externalization” and “absorption” of the immanent 
object creates a situation analogue to the one existing between two objects which are similar with 
respect to one of their features, like colour, for example: just as a yellow house H is similar to another 
yellow house H’ with respect to colour because H and H’ are bearers of qualities perceived as yellow, a 
subject accepting A becomes mentally similar to “the existence of A” (i.e. to a judgment content, which 
is a non-real consequence of A, existing in the outer world independently of any mental act) because of 
the act’s moment in virtue of which it is an accepting of A.The fact that the two situations are not (and 
                                                      
178 A. MARTY, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie, § 70, p. 333: “Und dass 
überhaupt irgend eine reale Änderung vorsichgehen muss, damit die nichtreale Relation der Gleichfarbigkeit zu bestehen 
aufhört, stimmt durchaus mit unserer Lehre, dass das Nichtreale, wenn es entsteht und vergeht, als Folge des Entstehens und 
Vergehens von Realem auftritt und vergeht.”  
179 A. MARTY, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie, § 102, p. 423: “Ja ich glaube, 
man kann unbedenklich sagen, es gehöre zum Wesen jeder psychischen Tätigkeit ein Vorgang zu sein, der zur Folge hat, daß 
dadurch das psychisch Tätige primär etwas anderem als es selbst ideel konform wird.” 
180 A. MARTY, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie, § 102, p. 425: “Während das 
Vorstellen wesentlich eine Adäquation mit den Unterschieden des Was eines Objektes ist, ist das Urteilen eine Konformation 
zu dessen Sein oder nicht Sein […].” 
The immanent object externalized and absorbed (1906 and later) 
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cannot be) exactly the same181 justifies the description of mental assimilation as a kind of sui generis 
relation of similitude. 
3. Concluding remarks 
By way of a conclusion, and in order to present the results of this study in a synthetic perspective, we 
shall suggest answers to the following four questions: i) How is Brentano’s theory of intentionality to be 
characterized? ii) How is Marty’s late conception of intentionality as mental assimilation to be 
understood? iii) Which is the relationship between Marty and Brentano in that respect? iv) Beyond 
Brentano himself and other members of his circle, which could have been Marty’s sources for his later 
theory of intentionality? 
i) In section one, we discussed today’s two dominant readings of Brentano’s intentionality thesis: the 
Discontinuist (DI) and the Continuist (CI) interpretations, wich diverge mainly on the pre-reistic 
Brentano (i.e. before 1904). As we saw, both interpretations offer convincing arguments based on a 
careful analysis of the sources. Nonetheless there are problematic claims in each of them. Against DI, 
some passages of Brentano’s works, from the time of the Psychology of 1874 onwards, cleary show that 
the mental act is directed toward something which is not relative to the act182; this seems to entail that 
the intentional object is not identical with a mind dependent entity relative to the act. Against CI, by 
contrast, there are passages where Brentano says that the mental act is directed toward something which 
is relative to the act, which seems to imply that the intentional object is identical with a mind dependent 
entity relative to the act183. In the face of such incompatibilities, there seems to be only one possible way 
out. The pre-reistic Brentano works with a phenomenological concept of object – something like an object 
per se or tout court (Gegenstand schlechtweg)184 – which is indifferent with respect to existence and non-
existence, and is not relative to the act; at the same time, Brentano acknowledges a mental correlate of 
the primary act which, even if it is not its target object, is nevertheless required as a means leading to the 
target object. Accordingly, the primary act grasps what is presented tout court (the Objekt), but through 
what is presented as presented (das Gedachte als Gedachtes, the correlate). The primary act and the correlate 
are grasped by the secondary act. The secondary act, from a synoptic point of view, grasps as a means the 
                                                      
181 The difference between the two situations is this : in the case of the houses, the two terms of the relation of similitude 
are the houses themselves, and there is a symmetry between the terms (both are coloured objects) ; in the case of the judging 
subject and its object, by contrast, the terms of the relation of mental assimiliation (or mental similitude) are different : we 
have a real mental act on one side, and a non-real judgment content on the other; furthermore, the subject does not become 
similar to the object A, but to its non-real consequence (i.e. the existence of A). Accepting A amounts ipso facto to become 
mentally similar to the existence of A. If the accepting is correct (i.e. if the judgment is true), the mental similitude at stake is 
a correlation; if it is false, we have to do with a merely possible correlation, i.e. a relative determination (or relative 
Bestimmung). 
182 See for example the passage of the Psychology of 1874 quoted above, n. 56: “The concept of sound is not a relative 
concept.” 
183 See F. BRENTANO, Descriptive Psychology, p. 23: “As in every relation, two correlates can be found here. The one 
correlate is the act of consciousness, the other is that which it is directed upon. […] <for example> Presenting and what is 
presented.” [transl. Müller, slightly modified]. See as well Deskriptive Psychologie, p. 158: “Das Wesenhafte ist unsere in 
Relation gesetzte Seele; das Unwesenhafte deren Korrelat; etwas worauf unsere psychische Tätigkeit gerichtet ist, als solches”. 
Concerning the identity between object and correlate, see F. BRENTANO, Logik-Vorlesung [EL 72], p. 229, quoted in 
A. CHRUDZIMSKI, Die Ontologie Franz Brentanos, p. 155: “Wenden wir uns nun zur Analyse der Elemente unserer inneren 
Wahrnehmnungsvortstellung, so weit wie sie eben führen können. Ihr Objekt ist unser Selbst in seinen wirklichen 
mannigfachen psychischen Beziehungen mit intentionalen Korrelativen (immanenten Gegenständen). Denn dass ein solcher 
immer beim Psychischen gegeben und gegenüber dem Physischen dafür [d.h. für das Psychische] charakteristisch <ist>, 
haben wir früher gesehen.” See as well F. BRENTANO, Deskriptive Psychologie, p. 158: “Jedes Seelenphänomen hat mehrere 
Korrelate, ein primäres Objekt und ein sekundäres (...)”. 
184 See above, n. 74-77.  
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means leading the primary act to the object185. Such a reading offers the advantage to understand 
otherwise problematic passages where Brentano says that the primary act is directed toward the 
correlate186. On the interpretation we suggest here, this is to be understood as follows: the primary act is 
directed toward the correlate in the sense that through it, it reaches its object. The correlate is able to 
“point-beyond-itself” (it does what Husserl calls “über-sich-Hinausweisen”)187. 
ii) Marty’s theory of intentionality as it evolved from his articles Über subjectlose Sätze to his 
Untersuchungen, accounts for the intentional relation in terms of a sui generis similitude (ideelle 
Verähnlichung) between a thinking subject and its object. The main philosophical contribution of this 
theory is to qualify the kind of relation intentionality is. Such a qualification goes significantly further 
than saying that intentionality is a sui generis relation. By describing it as a sui generis relation of mental 
assimilation, Marty provides a model not only to account for the fact that psychic phenomena are linked 
to objects, but also and above all, to explain what ‘to be linked’ means in such a case. In his earlier 
theory (before 1906), the idea that intentionality is to be explained by a kind of peculiar similitude 
already plays a central role, but the terms of such a relation are the immanent object (das Vorgestellte als 
Vorgestelltes) on the one side, and the object tout court (der Gegenstand schlechtweg) on the other. As we 
suggested above, the key move leading to the later theory consists in a displacement of the mental term 
of the relation of similitude: it now holds, directly, between the mental act itself and its object (or 
whatever exists as a non-real consequence of it). Furthermore, mental assimilation is what Marty calls a 
grounded relation (begründete Relation), a feature which leads him to suggest an elegant account of the 
cases where what is thought of does not exist. In such a case, the subject is linked to the object by a 
merely possible correlation (this is his theory of the so-called relative determination or relative 
Bestimmung); when the presented object exists, by contrast, the subject stands in an actual correlation 
with it. In both cases, the relational entities involved (the actual correlation in the former case, the 
relative determination in the latter) have a special ontological status: they are existing, non-real entities 
(irrealia). 
iii) In the opening lines of this study, we announced that we would analyse the successive versions of 
Marty’s theory of intentionality with respect to their dependence upon, or independence from their 
Brentanian background. After having discussed Brentano’s and Marty’s different theories, we can now 
be more precise concerning the interaction between the two thinkers: we consider that Marty 
progressively distances himself from Brentano.  
Before the latter’s reistic turn of 1904, we believe, against Antonelli, that Marty has a theory which 
is similar to Brentano’s. In his famous 1905 letter to Marty, Brentano denies to have ever identified the 
mental correlate with the object. This letter has been interpreted by Antonelli as being directed against 
an erroneous reading of Brentano by Marty: the latter would have identified the mental correlate and the 
object, and even more, he would have originated what would become the standard DI reading of 
Brentano188. However, as we saw above189, as early as 1894, Marty writes something which corresponds 
                                                      
185 It is worth noticing that such an interpretation of Brentano’s theory resembles Twardowski’s interpretation of 
Brentano, and, by the way, Twardowski’s theory itself (see K. TWARDOWSKI, Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der 
Vorstellungen, p. 18 n. 1). See also R. ROLLINGER, Brentano’s Psychology and Logic and the Basis of Twardowski’s Theory of 
Presentations, in The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication, 4 (2009), pp. 1-23. 
186 Since we distinguish object and correlate, we know that our interpretation fails to explain how to understand the 
passages where Brentano identifies object and correlate (see above, n. 183). 
187 E. HUSSERL, Intentionale Gegenstände, p. 144. We will not discuss the arguments of Husserl against the defenders of 
means in theories of intentionality. 
188 See above, n. 8. 
189 See above, n. 146. 
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verbatim to what Brentano will write ten years later: the correlate and the object tout court are sharply 
distinguished190. Thus, provided that Brentano understands himself correctly in 1905, it is highly 
implausible that Marty misunderstood Brentano at all. The suspiscion of an erroneous reading of 
Brentano by Marty looses any ground when the following homonymy is taken into account:: Marty calls 
“intentional object” what Brentano calls “correlate”, and he calls “object tout court” (Gegenstand schlechtweg) 
what Brentano calls “intentional object”. The confusion, if there is any, is only terminological. A proof 
for that is to be found in the very same famous letter to Marty, where Brentano says: “what you call 
simply ‘object’ (einfach ‘Objekt’), but what I (...) allowed myself to call ‘immanent object’ (‘immanentes 
Objekt’)”191. 
After 1904, Marty markedly distances himself from his master in that he a) maintains an ontology of 
non-real entities among which relations in general and the intentional relation in particular play a crucial 
role; and b) conceives of the intentional relation as a mental assimilation and thereby formulates a theory 
which, as we saw above, goes well beyond the mere statement that intentionality is a sui generis relation.  
iv) As noted by Smith in his book of 1994192, Marty’s late theory of intentionality has a distinctive 
Aristotelian flavour. In the De anima, Aristotle says that in actual sensation and knowledge, the subject, 
in a way, has become the object: 
As we have said, what has the power of sensation is potentially like what the 
perceived object is actually; that is, while at the beginning of the process of its being 
acted upon the two interacting factors are dissimilar, at the end the one acted upon is 
assimilated to the other and is identical in quality with it.193 
As a matter of fact, the idea that cognition is to be explained in terms of a kind of similitude (similatio, 
assimilatio, adaequatio, etc.) is a Leitmotiv throughout the Aristotelian tradition and particularly in 
Scholasticism. See for example how Thomas Aquinas characterizes knowledge in the De veritate: 
[…] every cognition obtains by assimilation. But there cannot be any assimilation of a 
mind and material things, because a unity of quality yields similitude; but the qualities 
of material things are corporeal accidents which cannot exist in the mind. Therefore, 
the mind cannot cognize corporeal things. […] one has to answer that although 
corporeal qualities cannot exist in the mind, nonetheless, similitudes of corporeal 
qualities can exist in it, and it is in that respect that the mind gets assimilated with 
material things.194 
                                                      
190 A sharp distinction between mental correlate and object tout court is already present in Hillebrand’s book of 1891: Die 
neuen Theorien der kategorischen Schlüsse. Moreover, this distinction, as one knows, is present in Höfler’s 1890 Logik (written 
with the help of Meinong) and in Twardowski’s Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen (F. HILLEBRAND, Die neuen 
Theorien der kategorischen Schlüsse, Alfred Hölder, Wien 1891, p. 36-38; A. HÖFLER, Logik. Unter Mitwirkung von Dr. Alexius 
Meinong, p. 6-7, K. TWARDOWSKI, Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen, p. 4). 
191 F. BRENTANO, Wahrheit und Evidenz, p. 88 (transl. CHISHOLM, POLITZER, FISCHER, p. 52, modified). Besides the 
expression “intentional object”, Marty of course uses also the word “correlate” to refer to the correlate. 
192 B. SMITH, Austrian Philosophy, p. 112. 
193 ARISTOTLE, De anima II, 5, 418a3-6; The Complete Works of Aristotle, p. 665. See as well De anima III, 8, 431a26-30. 
194 THOMAS AQUINAS, De veritate, q. 10, a. 4, arg. 5 et ad 5: “[…] omnis cognitio est per assimilationem. Sed non potest 
esse assimilatio inter mentem et materialia, quia similitudinem facit unitas qualitatis; qualitates autem rerum materialium sunt 
corporalia accidentia, quae in mente esse non possunt. Ergo mens non potest materialia cognoscere. […] dicendum, quod 
quamvis qualitates corporales non possint esse in mente, possunt tamen in ea esse similitudines corporearum qualitatum, et 
secundum has mens rebus corporeis assimilatur.”  
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If Aquinas is by far not the only medieval author to be considered here195, there are good reasons to 
think that his own Aristotelianism played a key role in the genesis of Marty’s late theory of intentionality. 
It is not the place to try to go into the details196, but we do not want to conclude this study without 
pointing at what could well turn out to be a piece of evidence. As a catholic theologian, Marty was 
trained in scholastic philosophy. There is no doubt that Aquinas was a central figure in the philosophy as 
it was taught to the young Marty197, and one can reasonably take for granted that besides the works of 
the Doctor angelicus himself, students and scholars of that time used standard works of reference such as 
philosophical compendia and lexica198. For late 19th-century readers of Aquinas, the main work of 
reference certainly was L. Schütz’s Thomas Lexikon, first published in 1881, and a second time in 1895 in 
a “zweite, sehr vergrösserte Auflage” as the title page says199. Now the first edition does not have any entry 
for ‘assimilatio’ (one jumps directly from ‘articulus’ to ‘assensio’). Things are different in the second 
edition, where one reads: “assimilatio: Verähnlichung”200. Of course, the Aristotelico-Scholastic idea 
that the soul becomes assimilated to the object is also used by Brentano in his theory of intentionality201. 
Nevertheless, Brentano, contrary to Marty, never insisted on this assimilation process; consequently, the 
systematization of this “scholastic” idea—that is: the differentia specifica of his own theory of 
intentionality—is to be put on Marty’s credit. And when the late Marty gives his own interpretation of 
truth as adequation, he suggests a remarkable modification of the classical definition (adaequatio intellectus 
et rei): “Veritas est adaequatio cogitantis et cogitati”202, a formula which undoubtedly echoes the one 
appearing many times in Aquinas: “Scientia dicitur assimilatio scientis ad scitum”203. 
                                                      
195 See for example the works of K. TACHAU (Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham. Optics, Epistemology and the 
Foundations of Semantics 1250-1345, Brill, Leiden, 1988), L. SPRUIT (Species intelligibilis. From Perception to Knowledge, 2 vols., 
Brill, Leiden, 1994), R. PASNAU (Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997), 
D. PERLER (Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter), D. PERLER (ed.), (Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality, Brill, 
Leiden 2001 (« Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, Bd. 76 »)), L.M. DE RIJK, A Study on the Medieval In- 
tentionality Debate up to ca. 1350, in GIRALDUS ODONIS O.F.M., Opera philosophia, volume two De inten- tionibus, ed. L.M. 
De Rijk, Brill, Leiden 2005, pp. 19-371 and H. LAGERLUND (ed.), (Representation and Objects of Thought in Medieval Philosophy, 
Ashgate, Aldershot, 2007). The idea that cognition is a kind of assimilation of the mind with its object is present not only in 
perspectivists like Roger Bacon, but also in critiques of this theory such as John Duns Scotus. Furthermore, the notion of 
assimilation plays also a role in Peter John Olivi’s theory of cognition, for example, an author rejecting species intelligibiles, and 
with whose position Marty’s final theory (assimilation without an intermediary, representational entity) bears some affinities. 
One can also note that Marty’s arguments for the rejection of immanent objects remind of Ockham’s resons for the rejection 
of species. 
196 We plan to explore the “medieval” part in Marty’s theory in a subsequent study. 
197 In 1867, during his studies of theology in Mainz, Marty wrote a (now lost) piece of more than 300 pages with the title : 
“Die Lehre des heiligen Thomas über die Abstraktion der übersinnlichen Ideen aus den sinnlichen Bildern nebst Darstellung und Kritik der 
übrigen Erkenntnistheorien”. It seems that it is during the redaction of this work that Marty first came in contact with the work 
of Brentano (see O. KRAUS, Martys Leben und Werke. Eine Skizze, in J. EISENMEIER, A. KASTIL, O. KRAUS (Hrsg.), A. MARTY, 
Gesammelte Schriften, I.1, p. 3). 
198 It appears for example that a good part of what Marty knew about medieval logic in general and supposition theory in 
particular comes from C. PRANTL’s Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande, first published between 1855 and 1890 – see L. CESALLI, 
F. GOUBIER, Marty on Naming (Nennen) and Meaning (Bedeuten). 
199 Ludwig Schütz was a pupil of Brentano during his time in Würzbourg, which makes it plausible that he and Marty 
knew each other – see, D. FISETTE, G. FRÉCHETTE, Le legs de Brentano, p. 24. 
200  L. SCHÜTZ, Thomas-Lexikon. Sammlung, Übersetzung und Erklärung der in sämtlichen Werken des h. Thomas von Aquin 
vorkommenden Kunstausdrucke und wissenschaftlichen Aussprüche, Ferdinand Schöningh, Pradeborn, 1895, p. 70. 
201 F. BRENTANO, Deskriptive Psychologie, p. 26-27 (transl. MÜLLER, p. 29), F. BRENTANO, “Vom ens rationis”, in ID., Die 
Abkehr vom Nichtrealen, p. 324. 
202 A. MARTY, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie, § 102, p. 426. 
203 See for example THOMAS AQUINAS, De Veritate, q. 11, a. 1, arg. 11. 
